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A COMMON LAW FOR THE STATUTORY ERA:
THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY AND NEW YORK'S
RIGHT OF PRIVACY STATUTE
I. Introduction
In Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc.,' the widows of Stanley Laurel
and Oliver Hardy sued the copyright owners of certain Laurel and
Hardy motion pictures because of their merchandizing of the actors'
names and likenesses. 2 Acknowledging the defendants' copyrights,3
the complaint conceded use of film "stills" to the defendants.
4
Nonetheless, the complaint asserted that the actors had valid property
rights in their names and likenesses, independent of the copyrights,
that descended to their heirs.5 The court agreed, 6 distinguishing the
instant case, in which the actors portrayed themselves, from other
situations, in which actors develop fictional characters that are copy-
rightable in their own right.7 Therefore, the court entered an in-
junction against the defendant and awarded damages to the plaintiffs.8
The Price decision is predicated on the common law right of
publicity. 9 The doctrine, which recently has gained wide recognition
from judges, 10 legislators" and scholars,' 2 affords an individual the
1. 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
2. Id. at 838.
3. Id. at 840.
4. Id. at 842.
5. Id. at 839.
6. Id. at 846.
7. Id. at 845.
8. Id. at 847.
9. See Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866,
868 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
10. See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573
(1977) (state has an "interest in permitting a 'right of publicity' "); Martin Luther
King, Jr., Center For Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Prods., Inc., 694
F.2d 674, 680 (l1th Cir. 1983) ("public figures have a ... right of publicity");
Haelan Laboratories, 202 F.2d at 868 (independent of right of privacy, "a man has
a right in the publicity value of his photograph"); Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316
F. Supp. 1277, 1281 (D. Minn. 1970).
11. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 990, 3344 (West Supp. 1987); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 391.170 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-25-1101 to -1108
(1984). Other state legislatures, under the aegis of the right of privacy, have also
created publicity rights. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540.08 (West 1972); NEB. REV.
STrAT. §§ 20-202, 20-208 (1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 839.2, 839.3 (West
1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-40 (1984). Other statutes prohibit the misappropriation
of another's name, photograph or likeness, but these either deny descendibility or
fail to address the issue. See MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 214, § 3A (Law. Co-op. 1986);
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right to control and profit from the exploitation of his 3 persona, 4
i.e., "the public image that makes people want to identify with the
object person, and thereby imbues his name or likeness with com-
mercial value marketable to those that seek such identification."' 5
The scope of the right of publicity includes aspects of an individual,
such as name or likeness, that attain value from his persona. 16
The right of publicity emanated from recognition that the right
of privacy, 7 which protects an individual's feelings, did not suffi-
ciently protect against the commercial misappropriation of a per-
sona. 8 Indeed, New York's right of privacy statute provides individuals
with protection that is in part identical to that safeguarded by the
right of publicity. 19 The privacy statute proscribes the use of a living
person's "name, portrait or picture" for "advertising purposes, or
for the purposes of trade" without his written consent. 20
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-28 (1985); UTAH CODE ANN. § 45-3-1 to -6 (1981); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 895.50 (West 1983).
12. See, e.g., Gordon, Right of Property in Name, Likeness, Personality and
History, 55 Nw. U.L. REv. 553, 613 (1960) (approving recognition of causes of
action involving appropriation of proprietary rights in name, likeness, personality
and history) [hereinafter Gordon]; Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 203, 216 (1954) (protection of "persons who have ... nurtured
the fruit of publicity values" necessitates judicial recognition of the right of publicity)
[hereinafter Nimmer]; Simon, Right of Publicity Reified: Fame as Business Asset,
30 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 699, 699 (1985) ("the famous have an interest in the
fruits of fame") [hereinafter Simon]; Sims, Right of Publicity: Survivability Re-
considered, 49 FoRDHA" L. REV. 453, 455-56 (1981) (accepting right of publicity
as general matter and recommending its survivability) [hereinafter Sims]; Treece,
Commercial Exploitation of Names, Likenesses, and Personal Histories, 51 TEx.
L. REV. 637, 643 (1973) ("[a]n individual, particularly a celebrity, ... has an
economic interest in his personality") [hereinafter Treece].
13. Throughout this Note, the pronouns "he," "his" and "him" include ref-
erences to "she," "her's" or "her," unless the context suggests otherwise, to avoid
awkward grammatical constructions that would likely occur because of the limita-
tions of the English language.
14. See Bi-Rite Enters., Inc. v. Bruce Miner Co., 757 F.2d 440, 442 (1st Cir.
1985); Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956, 957 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980); Lind, The Right of Publicity in New York: A
Practical Analysis, 7 ART & THE LAW 355, 355 (1983).
15. Bi-Rite Enters., Inc. v. Button Master, 555 F. Supp. 1188, 1199 (S.D.N.Y.
1983) (citing Winner, Right of Identity: Right of Publicity and Protection of a
Trademark's "Persona," 71 TRADEmAR. REP. 193, 193 (1981)).
16. "Persona" denotes not only name, picture and likeness but also voice, style
and attributes, such as a baseball player's fielding and batting statistics or Charlie
Chaplin's cigar, glasses and bushy eyebrows. See Onassis v. Christian Dior-New
York, Inc., 122 Misc. 2d 603, 612, 472 N.Y.S.2d 254, 261 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1984).
17. See infra notes 107-13 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 37, 55-63 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 134-96 and accompanying text.
20. N.Y. Crv. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50, 51 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1987).
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RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
In a landmark decision implicating New York's right of privacy
statute, Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc. ,21
the Second Circuit held that "in addition to and independent of
[the] right of privacy . . . a man has a right in the publicity value
of his photograph." 22 This case, precedent for the proposition that
the right of publicity exceeds the scope of the privacy statute, has
led the federal courts of the Second Circuit to develop a common
law right of publicity under New York law. 23
Unlike these federal courts, however, the New York Court of
Appeals has never expressly recognized a common law right of
publicity in the state. 4 Indeed, writing for New York's highest court
in December of 1984, Chief Judge Wachtler stated: "Since the 'right
of publicity' is encompassed under the Civil Rights Law as an aspect
of the right of privacy, . . . [a] plaintiff cannot claim an independent
common-law right of publicity." ' 25 Less than one year later, however,
following a contrary determination by the appellate division, 26 the
court of appeals equivocated: "[W]e do not pass upon the question
of whether a common-law descendible right of publicity exists in
this [s]tate. ' ' 27 Thus, the existence of an independent common law
right of publicity remains at issue in New York. 21
This Note compares New York's right of privacy statute with the
right of publicity and considers whether New York courts, in ac-
cordance with the judiciary's traditional lawmaking role, should
recognize a common law right of publicity.29 Initially, it reviews the
21. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
22. 202 F.2d at 868.
23. See, e.g., Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426, 429 (S.D.N.Y.
1978) (right of publicity descends only if decedent exploited it during his lifetime,
that is, "acted in such a way as to evidence his . . . recognition of the extrinsic
commercial value of his . . . name or likeness, and manifested that recognition in
some overt manner"); Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836, 844
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (right of publicity "does not terminate upon death"); Grant v.
Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876, 879 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) ("[tlhe 'right of publicity'
is somewhat akin to the exclusive right of a commercial enterprise to the benefits
to be derived from the goodwill and secondary meaning that it has managed to
build up in its name").
24. See Brinkley v. Casablancas, 80 A.D.2d 428, 435, 438 N.Y.S.2d 1004, 1009
(1st Dep't 1981). But see infra notes 241-47 and accompanying text.
25. Stephano v. News Group Publications, Inc., 64 N.Y.2d 174, 183, 474 N.E.2d
580, 584, 485 N.Y.S.2d 220, 224 (1984).
26. See Southeast Bank, N.A. v. Lawrence, 104 A.D.2d 213, 219, 483 N.Y.S.2d
218, 223 (1st Dep't 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 66 N.Y.2d 910, 912, 489 N.E.2d
744, 745, 498 N.Y.S.2d 775, 776 (1985).
27. Lawrence, 66 N.Y.2d at 912, 489 N.E.2d at 745, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 776.
28. See, e.g., Barry, The Recent Developments in the Right of Publicity, N.Y.L.J.,
Feb. 22, 1985, at 5, col. 1.
29. See infra notes 70-196, 220-348 and accompanying text.
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historical development of the rights of privacy and publicity in the
United States and their current articulation in New York.30 The Note
then asserts that the unauthorized exploitation of a persona, such
as the marketing of a model's posters without her consent31 or the
use of a celebrity's look-alike to imply his endorsement of a product
without his consent,3 2 merits judicial recognition of a common law
right of publicity in New York.33 Finally, in response to the argument
that a judge-made right of publicity-regardless of its value-would
impermissibly encroach on the legislature's prerogative, the Note
addresses the propriety of court-initiated change today and concludes
that some traditional justifications for judge-made law remain per-
suasive.3
II. History of the Rights of Privacy and Publicity: Protection
of a Persona From Unauthorized Exploitation
The rights of privacy and publicity both protect an individual's
persona from unauthorized exploitation." The rights, however, pro-
tect against different kinds of injury.3 6 This Part briefly presents
the historical development and current understanding of these rights,
and concludes by contrasting them.
A. The Right of Privacy
Commentators first noted the right of privacy, which secures an
individual's right "to be let alone," almost a century ago.37 In their
seminal article, The Right of Privacy,38 Samuel D. Warren and Louis
30. See infra notes 35-196 and accompanying text.
31. See Brinkley v. Casablancas, 80 A.D.2d 428, 430, 438 N.Y.S.2d 1004, 1006
(1st Dep't 1981) (court resolved Christie Brinkley's identical complaint under New
York's right of privacy statute while stating in dictum that the state's common
law fails to recognize the right of publicity).
32. See Allen v. National Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 617 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
(court resolved Woody Allen's identical complaint under New York's right of
privacy statute, finding it unnecessary to rule on the right of publicity cause of
action).
33. See infra notes 220-85 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 286-348 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 55-63, 93-106, 144-60 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 37-45, 88-92, 114-19, 136-43 and accompanying text.
37. See T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS OR THE WRONGS WHICH
ARISE INDEPENDENT OF CONTRACT 29 (2d ed. 1888); W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R.
KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 849 &
n.3 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON]; Warren & Brandeis, The Right
to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193, 196 (1890) [hereinafter Warren & Brandeis].
38. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 37, at 193.
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D. Brandeis asserted that the right must be recognized lest trade in
gossip diminish social standards.39 Warren and Brandeis proceeded
from the general proposition that an "individual shall have full
protection in [his] person and ... property. '"40 To reinforce their
justification of a remedy for "mere injury to the feelings, '41 which
had previously been uncompensable, Warren and Brandeis illustrated
that the right of privacy was already being protected.4 2 The law,
they asserted, protected the right of privacy not on "the principle
of private property, but that of an inviolate personality. '43 Specif-
ically, the authors demonstrated that common law protection against
unauthorized publication of an owner's intellectual property rested
"not in the right to take the profits arising from publication, but
in the peace of mind or the relief afforded by the ability to prevent
any publication at all." 44 In their conclusion, the authors argued
that privacy rights, unlike those arising from contractual or fiduciary
relationships, are "rights as against the world." '45
1. The Right of Privacy at Common Law
In the decade following the release of the Warren and Brandeis
article, professional debate raged over the existence of the right of
privacy. 6 It was not until 1905, however, that a landmark decision
39. See id. Warren and Brandeis found other reasons to protect the right to
be left alone:
The intensity and complexity of life, attendant upon advancing civilization,
have rendered necessary some retreat from the world, and man, under
the refining influence of culture, has become more sensitive to publicity,
so that solitude and privacy have become more essential to the individual;
but modern enterprise and invention have, through invasions upon his
privacy, subjected him to mental pain and distress, far greater than could
be inflicted by mere bodily injury.
Id. at 196.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 197.
42. See id. at 193, 197.
43. Id. at 205.
44. Id. at 200.
45. Id. at 213. The remainder of the article explains limitations on the right
of privacy, and remedies available for its infringement.
46. Savell, Right of Privacy-Appropriation of a Person's Name, Portrait, or
Picture for Advertising or Trade Purposes Without Prior Written Consent: History
and Scope in New York, 48 ALB. L. REV. 1, 5 nn.19-20 (1983) [hereinafter Savell].
Some commentators favored recognition of the right of privacy. See, e.g., Note,
Injunctions Against Publications Intruding Upon Privacy, 43 U. PA. L. REV. 134,
135 (1895); Comment, The Right To Privacy, 11 YALE L.J. 53, 54 (1901); cf.
Corliss v. Walker, 64 F. 280, 282-83 (D. Mass. 1894) (if right of privacy exists,
publicity waives it and death extinguishes it). Other authority opposed recognition.
1987]
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recognized such a right at common law. 47 In Pavesich v. New England
Life Insurance Co. ,48 the Supreme Court of Georgia held that the
unauthorized publication of a person's picture in an advertisement
to promote the publisher's business violated the person's right of
privacy.49 Although Pavesich became the leading case in the area,
courts issued divergent opinions for the next thirty years.5 0 As the
Restatement of Torts5' gained acceptance, however, "the tide set in
strongly in favor of recognition." 5
Early cases recognizing a common law right of privacy, concerned
with the threshold question of existence, gave little consideration
to its parameters. 3 Commentators, rather than the judiciary, took
the lead in defining the extent of the right 4 Today, however, it is
generally agreed that "[tihe law of privacy comprises four distinct
kinds of invasion of four different interests of the plaintiff, which
are tied together by the common name, but otherwise have almost
nothing in common except that each represents an interference with
the right of the plaintiff . . . 'to be let alone.' "I'
One text writer has described these four torts in the following
manner:
1. Intrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion or solitude, or into his
private affairs.
2. Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the
plaintiff.
3. Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public
eye.
See Atkinson v. Doherty & Co., 121 Mich. 372, 384, 80 N.W. 285, 289 (1899);
Hadley, The Right to Privacy, 3 Nw. U.L. REV. 1, 3 (1894).
47. See Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905).
48. Id.
49. See id. at 220, 50 S.E. at 81.
50. Prosser, The Right of Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 386 (1960) [hereinafter
Prosser]. Compare Henry v. Cherry & Webb, 30 R.I. 13, 73 A. 97 (1909) (rejecting
recognition of right of privacy) and Hillman v. Star Publishing Co., 64 Wash.
691, 117 P. 594 (1911) (same) with Kunz v. Allen, 102 Kan. 883, 172 P. 532 (1918)
(recognizing right of privacy) and Schwartz v. Edrington, 133 La. 235, 62 So. 660
(1913) (same).
51. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 867 (1939). Section 867 provides: "A person who
unreasonably and seriously interferes with another's interest in not having his affairs
known to others or his likeness exhibited to the public is liable to the other." Id.
52. Prosser, supra note 50, at 386 & nn.17-43.
53. Id. at 388.
54. See, e.g., Green, The Right of Privacy, 27 ILL. L. REV. 237 (1932); Pound,
Interests of Personality, 28 HARv. L. REV. 343 (1915); Prosser, supra note 50, at
389; Warren & Brandeis, supra note 37, at 200.
55. Prosser, supra note 50, at 389.
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4. Appropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of the plaintiff's
name or likeness.5 6
An example of the "intrusion" cause of action is a case in which
a landlord physically moves in on a tenant5 7 or technologically enters
a tenant's bedroom through wiretaps.5 8 The classic "publication of
private facts" case involved a prostitute, tried for murder but ac-
quitted, who subsequently married and led an "exemplary" life in
another state.5 9 Release of a film portraying her experiences, which
used her true maiden name and was advertised as a factual account,
led to plaintiff's suit.6 0 In a recent "false light" case,6' the Supreme
Court held that a journalist, who had implied that the widow of
a disaster victim had been present but almost catatonic during the
journalist's visit five months later to record its repercussions, violated
the widow's right of privacy. 62 Finally, plaintiffs have used the
"appropriation" tort to prohibit the unauthorized publication of
their photograph or likeness in newspaper advertisements. 6
Different as the torts are, they share several important features:
they are personal64 and non-assignable.65 Moreover, limited waiver
of the rights against invasion of privacy may be implied against
those in the public eye because of first amendment concerns.6 6 A
worthy plaintiff may seek injunction and damages to remedy his
injury.67 New York's right of privacy is among the most circumscribed
in the United States. 6 The limitation stems from the peculiar history
56. Id.
57. See Welsh v. Pritchard, 125 Mont. 517, 241 P.2d 816 (1952).
58. See Hamberger v. Eastman, 106 N.H. 107, 206 A.2d 239 (1964).
59. See Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931).
60. See id.
61. See Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974).
62. See id.
63. See, e.g., Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N.C. 780, 195 S.E. 55 (1938).
64. Prosser, supra note 50, at 408 & n.200.
65. Id. at 408 & n.202; see, e.g., Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House,
Inc., 58 Misc. 2d 1, 7, 294 N.Y.S.2d 122, 129 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1968), aff'd,
32 A.D.2d 892, 301 N.Y.S.2d 948 (1st Dep't 1969).
66. See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 496 (1975); Time, Inc.
v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387-88 (1967); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 279-80 (1964); Prosser, supra note 50, at 410-15.
67. Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 250 (9th Cir. 1971) (permitting
damages for invasion of privacy); Leverton v. Curtis Publishing Co., 192 F.2d
974, 978 (3d Cir. 1951) (same); Brinkley v. Casablancas, 80 A.D.2d 428, 444, 438
N.Y.S.2d 1004, 1014 (1st Dep't 1981) (granting damages and injunction for invasion
of privacy).
68. See Manger v. Kree Inst. of Electrolysis, 233 F.2d 5, 8 n.3a (2d Cir. 1956);
Prosser, supra note 50, at 402-403.
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of the right of privacy in the state. 69
2. New York's Right of Privacy Statute
Unlike most states,7 0 New York has no common law right of
privacy.7' Although lower New York courts discussed the right several
times in the years immediately succeeding publication of the Warren
and Brandeis article,7 2 the state's highest court avoided the issue
until 1902. 71 In that year, the court decided Roberson v. Rochester
Folding Box Co.,74 which presented facts almost identical to those
appearing three years later in the Pavesich case discussed above. 75
69. Prosser, supra note 50, at 402-403; see also infra notes 70-99 and accompa-
nying text.
70. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF TORTS 804 (4th ed. 1971) ("[in
one form or another, the right of privacy is by this time recognized and accepted
in all but a very few jurisdictions"), quoted in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,
420 U.S. 469, 488 (1975).
71. See Stephano v. News Group Publications, Inc., 64 N.Y.2d 174, 182-83,
474 N.E.2d 580, 583-84, 485 N.Y.S.2d 220, 223-24 (1984); Wojtowicz v. Delacorte
Press, 43 N.Y.2d 858, 860, 374 N.E.2d 129, 130, 403 N.Y.S.2d 218, 219 (1978);
Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc., 304 N.Y. 354, 358, 107 N.E.2d 485, 487 (1952).
72. See Marks v. Jaffa, 6 Misc. 290, 292, 26 N.Y.S. 908, 909 (N.Y.C. Super.
Ct. N.Y. County 1893) (court enjoined defendant, editor of newspaper, from
publishing picture of plaintiff actor, holding that no institution "has the right to
use the name or picture of anyone for [a trade] without his consent"); Mackenzie
v. Soden Mineral Springs Co., 18 N.Y.S. 240, 249 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1891)
(physician obtained injunction against unauthorized use of his name to advertise
a medicine on ground of injury to reputation); Schuyler v. Curtis, 15 N.Y.S. 787,
789 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1891) (motion by nephew to continue preliminary in-
junction restraining defendants from exhibiting statue of Mary M. Schuyler, dece-
dent, upheld under right of privacy), aff'd, 19 N.Y.S. 264 (1st Dep't 1892), rev'd
subsequently, 147 N.Y. 434, 451, 42 N.E. 22, 27 (1895) (though "[n]ot assuming
to decide what this right of privacy is, in all cases," court rejected claim because
nephew did not represent any right of privacy surviving Mrs. Schuyler's death); Manola
v. Stevens, N.Y. Times, June 15, 1890, at 2, col. 3; N.Y. Times, June 18, 1890,
§ 1, at 3, col. 2; N.Y. Times, June 21, 1890, at 2, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1890) (plaintiff, photographed without her consent by defendants while appearing
in tights on stage at Broadway theater, won permanent injunction against publica-
tion by defendant).
73. See Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442
(1902).
74. Id.
75. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text. In Roberson, the defendants
made unauthorized prints of the plaintiff, Abigail M. Roberson, and used them
to advertise flour they manufactured and sold. Roberson, 171 N.Y. at 542-43, 64
N.E. at 442-43. The plaintiff alleged without contradiction that the "scoffs and
jeers" of persons who recognized her had greatly humiliated her so that "she was
made sick ... and compelled to employ a physician." Id. at 542-43, 64 N.E. at
442. As a result, in what appeared to be an invasion of privacy claim, Roberson
sought an injunction and $15,000 "to reimburse her for the damages to her feel-
ings." Id. at 543, 64 N.E. at 443.
[Vol. XV
RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
In a four to three decision, the court of appeals refused to recognize
the existence of a right of privacy under the common law of New
York. 76 The court relied on several factors to reach its determination:
the complete lack of precedent; 77 the "vast amount of litigation"
that would result;71 the arbitrary limitation on scope;79 and the
inevitable problem of line-drawing ° that would be associated with
judicial recognition of the right. It should be noted, however, that
Judge Parker, wary of acting beyond the judiciary's mandate,"1
suggested legislation on the subject in his opinion for the court.8 2
The disposition of Roberson incited a storm of controversy.8 3
Publication of a New York Times' editorial 4 spurred a judge who
had joined the court's opinion to take "the unprecedented step"8 5
of publishing a law review article defending the decision.8 6 In 1903,
however, the controversy subsided when New York became the first
state to adopt a statute creating a right of privacy. 87
New York's right of privacy statute "was enacted as a direct
response to Roberson."18 Indeed, according to a case brought shortly
76. Id. at 556, 64 N.E. at 447.
77. Id. at 543, 64 N.E. at 443.
78. Id. at 545, 64 N.E. at 443.
79. See id.
80. Id. at 555, 64 N.E. at 447.
81. See id. at 545, 555, 64 N.E. at 443, 447.
82. See id. at 545, 64 N.E. at 443.
83. Most commentators favored recognition of the right of privacy by this time.
See, e.g., Note, Publication of Photograph as an Advertisement, 2 COLUM. L. REV.
486, 487 (1902); Note, Injunction-Rights of Privacy-Enforcement in Equity, 50
U. PA. L. REV. 669, 675 (1902); Right of Privacy (Book Review), 16 HARv. L. REV.
72, 72 (1902).
84. N.Y. Times, Aug. 23, 1902, § 1, at 8, col. 3. In describing the unwillingness
of the New York Court of Appeals to prohibit the unauthorized photographing of
Ms. Roberson and the subsequent publication of her pictures, as well as similar oc-
currences, the article stated:
If there be, as Judge Parker says there is, no law now to cover these
savage and horrible practices, practices incompatible with the claims of
the community in which they are allowed to be committed with impunity
to be called a civilized community, then the decent people will say that
it is high time that there were such a law.
Id. The article concluded with a call for legislation creating a right of privacy. Id.
85. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 37, § 117, at 850; see also S. HOFSTADTER
& G. HoRowrrz, THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY 28 (1964) [hereinafter HOFSTADTER &
HoRowrrz].
86. See O'Brien, The Right of Privacy, 2 COLUM. L. REV. 437 (1902).
87. 1903 N.Y. Laws ch. 132, §§ 1-2 (current amended version at N.Y. CiV.
RIGHTS LAW §§ 50, 51 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1987)); see also PROSSER & KEETON,
supra note 37, § 117, at 850-51.
88. Arrington v. New York Times Co., 55 N.Y.2d 433, 439, 434 N.E.2d 1319,
1321, 449 N.Y.S.2d 941, 943 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1146 (1983); see also
HOFSTADTER & HOROWITZ, supra note 85, at 28.
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after passage of the statute, "there can be little doubt that its
enactment was prompted by the suggestion" of Judge Parker in his
Roberson opinion.8 9 Addressing the Roberson-type situation, in which
a plaintiff suffers "damages to [his] feelings," 90 the legislature de-
signed the statute "to protect the sentiments, thoughts and feelings
of an individual" 91 from injury by the commercial misappropriation
89. Rhodes v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co.,. 193 N.Y. 223, 227, 85 N.E. 1097,
1098 (1908) (emphasis added), aff'd, 220 U.S. 502 (1911). This case appears to be
the first to construe the New York statute. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying
text.
90. Roberson, 171 N.Y. at 543, 64 N.E. at 443; see also supra note 75.
91. Flores v. Mosler Safe Co., 7 N.Y.2d 276, 280, 164 N.E.2d 853, 855, 196
N.Y.S.2d 975, 978 (1959) (citation omitted); see also Bi-Rite Enters., Inc. v. Button
Master, 555 F. Supp. 1188, 1198 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) ("[s]ection 51 protects a person's
feelings and right to be let alone"); Meeropol v. Nizer, 381 F. Supp. 29, 36 n.6
(S.D.N.Y. 1974) ("right of privacy has developed to compensate an individual for
the injury to his feelings, to prevent inaccurate portrayal of private life, and, in
some instances, to prevent one's private life from being depicted at all"), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1013 (1978); Cohen v. Herbal Concepts, Inc., 100 A.D.2d 175, 178, 473
N.Y.S.2d 426, 428 (1st Dep't) ("statute affords protection against the commercial
exploitation of one's 'name, portrait or picture' and furnishes a remedy for the
injury to a person's feelings and sentiments"), aff'd, 63 N.Y.2d 379, 472 N.E.2d
307, 482 N.Y.S.2d 457 (1984); Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane & Bernbach, Inc., 58
A.D.2d 620, 621, 396 N.Y.S.2d 661, 664 (2d Dep't 1977) ("Itlhe statutory right
is deemed a 'right of privacy' and is based upon the classic right of privacy's
theoretical basis, which is to prevent injury to feelings"); Wojtowicz v. Delacorte
Press, 58 A.D.2d 45, 47, 395 N.Y.S.2d 205, 206 (1st Dep't 1977) ("right of privacy
or the right of a person to live his life quietly and to be left alone rests solely
in and is limited by statute") (quoting Flores, 7 N.Y.2d at 280, 164 N.E.2d at 854,
196 N.Y.S.2d at 977), aff'd, 43 N.Y.2d 858, 374 N.E.2d 129, 403 N.Y.S.2d 218
(1978); Wilson v. Brown, 189 Misc. 79, 80, 73 N.Y.S.2d 587, 588 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 1947) (statute "was meant to protect private rights and to prevent invasion
of the individual and personal right to privacy") (emphasis in original).
Another line of cases, however, implies that the purpose of the New York
statute was to prevent the unjust enrichment of a person by prohibiting unauthorized
commercial exploitation of his name or photograph. See, e.g., Arrington v. New
York Times Co., 55 N.Y.2d 433, 439, 434 N.E.2d 1319, 1321, 449 N.Y.S.2d 941,
943 (1982) (in order to address specific circumstances presented in Roberson,
legislature drafted statute "narrowly to encompass only the commercial use of an
individual's name or likeness and no more"), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1146 (1983);
Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc., 304 N.Y. 354, 358, 107 N.E.2d 485, 487 (1952)
(policy underlying statute is to protect individual against "selfish, commercial ex-
ploitation"), aff'd, 26 N.Y.2d 806, 257 N.E.2d 895, 309 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1970); Davis
v. High Soc'y Magazine, Inc., 90 A.D.2d 374, 381, 457 N.Y.S.2d 308, 314 (2d Dep't
1982) ("purpose of sections 50 and 51 is to prohibit commercial misappropriation
of a person's name or picture"); Cardy v. Maxwell, 9 Misc. 2d 329, 331, 169 N.Y.S.2d
547, 550 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1957) (sections were intended "to prevent commer-
cial exploitation of a person's name, portrait or picture") (emphasis in original);
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of his name or likeness. 92
Today, the statute is codified in the New York Civil Rights Law. 93
Kline v. Robert M. McBride & Co., 170 Misc. 974, 982, 11 N.Y.S.2d 674, 682 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1939) (sections were "designed to stop the merchandising in the
channels of normal trade of a portrait of a person who occupies a position in which
there is monetary value by publicizing same"). Judges have imputed this economic
purpose not only from the language of the statute, under which commercial uses
alone are proscribed, see N.Y. Crv. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50, 51 (McKinney 1976 & Supp.
1987), but also from the nature of the violation, which incorporates both privacy
and pecuniary interests. See Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538,
563, 64 N.E. 442, 450 (Gray, J., dissenting) ("for that complete personal security,
which will result in the peaceful and wholesome enjoyment of one's privileges as
a member of society, there should be afforded protection, not only against the scan-
dalous portraiture and display of one's features and person, but against the display
and use thereof for another's commercial purposes or gain") (emphasis added). The
language, however, reflects the legislature's attempt to provide a remedy for the type
of injury suffered by Ms. Roberson, who was humiliated as a result of the defen-
dant's publication of her picture to advertise its product. See id. at 542-43, 64 N.E.
at 442. The statute remedies the injury, invasion of privacy, of which Ms. Roberson
had complained, not infringement of the purely commercial right of publicity which
may occur concommitantly.
92. The legislature appears to have relied on Judge Gray in drafting the statute.
Although he drew significantly from the Warren and Brandeis article, see Roberson,
171 N.Y. at 563, 64 N.E. at 450 (Gray, J., dissenting), the statute fails to mention
the publication of private facts. See N.Y. Crv. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50, 51 (McKinney
1976 & Supp. 1987). Rather, "cast in terms of the use of someone's name, portrait
or picture, [the statute] most closely fits the appropriation branch of the common
law right of privacy." Greenawalt, New York's Right of Privacy-The Need For
Change, 42 BROOKLYN L. REv. 159, 176 (1975).
While some authority equates the appropriation branch of the privacy tort with
the right of publicity and by analogy extends New York's right of privacy statute
to the vindication of economic interests, see Bi-Rite Enters., Inc. v. Bruce Miner
Co., 757 F.2d 440, 442 (1st Cir. 1985) (quoting Prosser, supra note 50, at 854),
such authority is doctrinally suspect because the right of privacy is a personal right
ensuring an individual's right to be let alone while the right of publicity is a
proprietary right protecting a person's right to control the commercial exploitation
of his persona. See infra note 112.
Furthermore, in its concern over an individual's control of his name or likeness,
the legislature appears to have intended to fashion a personal right, based on the
protection of a person's privacy interest, rather than any pecuniary interest. This
inference follows from the legislature's apparent reliance on Judge Gray, see supra,
who in turn used the Warren and Brandeis article. See Roberson, 171 N.Y. at
563, 64 N.E. at 450 (Gray, J., dissenting). But see Kamakazi Music Corp. v.
Robbins Music Corp., 534 F. Supp. 69, 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (privacy rights vindicate
commercial value of nerson's name or likeness as well as "mental strain, humiliation,
[and] distress associated with the traditional notion of privacy"). It should be noted
that there is "little indication that Warren and Brandeis intended to direct their arti-
cle at . . . the exploitation of attributes of the plaintiff's identity." Prosser, supra
note 50, at 401; see also Nimmer, supra note 12, at 203 (statute extended scope
of privacy actions "beyond that envisaged by Brandeis and Warren").
93. N.Y. Cirv. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50, 51 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1987). Although
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Section 50 of the Civil Rights Law94 makes it a misdemeanor to
use a living person's "name, portrait or picture" for advertising or
other trade purposes without that person's written consent. 95 This
narrow statute, unlike the common law of other states, provides no
recovery for appropriations of the plaintiff's name for non-com-
mercial purposes. 96 Section 5 197 creates a private right to sue for an
injunction and damages. 98 In addition, section 51 contains a number
the legislature has limited its scope through amendment, the statute retains the
critical language it possessed when first passed in 1903. See 1903 N.Y. Laws ch.
132, §§ 1-2.
94. Section 50, entitled "Right of privacy," provides:
A person, firm or corporation that uses for advertising purposes, or for
the purposes of trade, the name, portrait or picture of any living person
without having first obtained the written consent of such person, or if
a minor of his or her parent or guardian, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 50 (McKinney 1976).
95. Id.
96. See id.; infra notes 167-71 and accompanying text.
97. Section 51, labelled "Action for injunction and for damages," provides:
Any person whose name, portrait or picture is used within this state for
advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade without the written
consent first obtained as above provided may maintain an equitable action
in the supreme court of this state against the person, firm or corporation
so using his name, portrait or picture, to prevent and restrain the use
thereof; and may also sue and recover damages for any injuries sustained
by reason of such use and if the defendant shall have knowingly used
such person's name, portrait or picture in such manner as is forbidden
or declared to be unlawful by section fifty of this article, the jury, in
its discretion, may award exemplary damages. But nothing contained in
this article shall be so construed as to prevent any person, firm or
corporation from selling or otherwise transferring any material containing
such name, portrait or picture in whatever medium to any user of such
name, portrait or picture, or to any third party for sale or transfer
directly or indirectly to such a user, for use in a manner lawful under
this article; nothing contained in this article shall be so construed as to
prevent any person, firm or corporation, practicing the profession of
photography, from exhibiting in or about his or its establishment spec-
imens of the work of such establishment, unless the same is continued
by such person, firm or corporation after written notice objecting thereto
has been given by the person portrayed; and nothing contained in this
article shall be so construed as to prevent any person, firm or corporation
from using the name, portrait or picture of any manufacturer or dealer
in connection with the goods, wares and merchandise manufactured,
produced or dealt in by him which he has sold or disposed of with such
name, portrait or picture used in connection therewith; or from using
the name, portrait or picture of any author, composer or artist in
connection with his literary, musical or artistic productions which he has
sold or disposed of with such name, portrait or picture used in connection
therewith.




of limitations on the right. 99 Together, these sections comprise New
York's privacy statute.
B. The Right of Publicity
The common law right of publicity affords an individual the right
to control and profit from the exploitation of his persona,' °° i.e.,
the image of him with which people want to identify.10' In practice,
the right protects the aspects of an individual that have been imbued
with value by his persona.'0 2 These aspects include name, 03 picture' °4
and likeness.105 Thus, if a person photographs Christie Brinkley and
distributes posters of the model without her consent, the photo-
grapher-distributor has "exploited" Brinkley's persona by misap-
99. Id.
100. See supra note 14.
101. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
102. The courts have found actionable exploitation in several situations. See
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 579 (1977) (televised
broadcast of human cannonball's entire act); Bi-Rite Enters., Inc. v. Bruce Miner
Co., 757 F.2d 440, 446 (1st Cir. 1985) (distribution of posters depicting plaintiff
musicians made from photographs legally obtained by defendants); Ali v. Playgirl,
Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 729 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (publication in magazine of portrait
of nude black man seated in corner of boxing ring); Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316
F. Supp. 1277, 1283 (D. Minn. 1970) (use of baseball players' names and statistics
in manufacturer's board game).
Some authority supports the view that only commercial exploitation is actionable.
See Bi-Rite Enters., 757 F.2d at 442; Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc.,
616 F.2d 956, 957 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980); Price v. Hal Roach
Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836, 843 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); see also PROSSER & KEETON,
supra note 37, § 117, at 851-54; Hoffman, The Right of Publicity: An Analytical
Update, 14 INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 14 (1982); Simon, supra note 12, at 709. The
better view, however, maintains that the right of publicity protects against non-
commercial exploitation as well because such use may diminish the subsequent value
of the right. See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 575; Nimmer, supra note 12, at 217; see
also Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876, 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (when person
misappropriates a right of publicity never before exercised, "[tihere may well be a
recognized first-time value (which diminishes with use)"). Copyright law supports
this view by its approach to an analogous situation, prohibiting non-profit public
performances because they reduce demand as much as for-profit public performances.
See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (1982). Because the rule of damages
will limit recovery for non-commercial exploitation, however, plaintiffs will rarely
bring such cases. See Nimmer, supra note 12, at 217.
103. Cepeda v. Swift & Co., 415 F.2d 1205, 1206 (8th Cir. 1969); Uhlaender,
316 F. Supp. at 1281.
104. Haelan Laboratories, 202 F.2d at 868; Factors Etc., Inc. v. Creative Card
Co., 444 F. Supp. 279, 282-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
105. Martin Luther King, Jr., Center for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage
Prods., Inc., 694 F.2d 674, 680 (11th Cir. 1983); Memphis Dev. Found., 616 F.2d
at 957-58; Ali, 447 F. Supp. at 728; Grant, 367 F. Supp. at 880.
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propriation of her photograph, which gives her a cause of action
under the right of publicity for injunction and damages against the
exploiter. 106
Although based on different policies0 7 and bounded by different
parameters, 08 the right of publicity has its origins in a case involving
New York's right of privacy.' °9 In fact, the first express reference
to the right of publicity occurred in a case involving New York's
right of privacy statute." 0 In Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps
Chewing Gum, Inc.,"' the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
recognized that, independent of the right of privacy,1 2 an individual
106. In Brinkley v. Casablancas, 80 A.D.2d 428, 438 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (1st Dep't
1981), which presented these same facts, the court ruled in favor of the model
under the New York right of privacy statute, see id. at 442-44, 438 N.Y.S.2d at
1013-14, but could well have decided the case under the right of publicity although
it stated in dictum that New York common law fails to recognize the right of
publicity. See id. at 435, 438, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 1009, 1011.
107. See infra notes 136-43 and accompanying text.
108. See infra notes 144-85 and accompanying text.
109. This development apparently happened because misappropriation of pho-
tograph cases, which were novel at the beginning of the century but have become
increasingly frequent, implicate both the right to be let alone and the right to
control the exploitation of one's persona. See Nimmer, supra note 12, at 204
(publicity "may be regarded as the reverse side of the coin of privacy"); Pilpel,
The Right of Publicity, 27 BULL. OF THE COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 249, 262 (1979-80)
("[a]t one and the same time, totally apart from your privacy interests, you have
a potentially exploitable right of publicity which enables you . . . to prevent others
from commercially exploiting your name and likeness and which permits you ...
to do so") [hereinafter Pilpel].
110. Haelan Laboratories, 202 F.2d at 868.
111. Id.
112. While the unauthorized commercial exploitation of an individual's name or
likeness implicates both the right of privacy and the right of publicity, it is the
appropriation branch of the privacy tort that protects his mental well-being and
the right of publicity that protects his financial interest. Cf. Chaplin v. National
Broadcasting Co., 15 F.R.D. 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). In other words:
Rather than recognizing the legal right to protection against the injury
to feelings which results from the commercial appropriation of elements
of personality [and is protected by the privacy statute, the] "right of
publicity" recognizes the pecuniary value which attaches to the names
and pictures of public figures . . . and the right of such people to this
financial benefit.
Id. at 139-40; see also Uhlaender, 316 F. Supp. at 1279-80 ("[although misap-
propriation of one's name, likeness or personality for commercial use has been
considered as one species of the general tort of invasion of privacy, many authorities
suggest that misappropriation is a distinctly independent tort"); Hirsch v. S.C.
Johnson & Son, Inc., 90 Wis. 2d 379, 387, 280 N.W.2d 129, 132 (1979) ("[firom
almost the very outset of the recognition of the right of privacy, there has been
an intermingling or confusion of the right of privacy and the right of control of
the commercial aspects of one's identity").
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has the right to control the exploitation of his photograph." 3 So
emerged the right of publicity.
Unlike the right of privacy and New York's privacy statute,"4 the right
of publicity does not protect personal concerns-those concerns that have
meaning solely in conjunction with a specific individual, as opposed to
property, which has value regardless of who owns it."I5 In other words, the
former right protects Brinkley from the helpless feeling of being used, a
feeling with which others can only empathize rather than feel on their
own when Brinkley is exploited. The latter right ensures the financial
stake she has in carefully marketing her image. In safeguarding this
proprietary interest, the right of publicity fosters two" 6 related
113. Haelan Laboratories, 202 F.2d at 868.
114. See supra notes 55-67, 88-98 and accompanying text.
115. See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 573 (purpose of right of publicity has "little to
do with protecting feelings or reputation"); Chaplin, 15 F.R.D. at 139 (rather than
protecting "against the injury to feelings which results from the commercial ap-
propriation of elements of personality, [the] 'right of publicity' recognizes the
pecuniary value which attaches to the names and pictures of public figures"); Pilpel,
supra note 109, at 253-57 (right of publicity does not protect against injury to
feelings but violation of property right).
116. Scholars have asserted that the right of publicity vindicates other interests
as well. For example, the right of publicity fosters production of creative works
by providing a financial incentive, for people to develop their talents. See Zacchini,
433 U.S. at 576 ("protection provides an economic incentive for him to make the
investment required to produce a performance of interest to the public"); Carson
v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 837 (6th Cir. 1983)
("[v]indication of the right will tend to encourage achievement"); Factors Etc.,
Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 652 F.2d 278, 287 (2d Cir. 1981) (right of publicity vindicates
"public policy of providing incentives for individual enterprise and investment of
capital"), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 927 (1982); Memphis, 616 F.2d at 958 (purpose
served by recognition of descendible right of publicity would be "the encouragement
of effort and creativity"); Hoffman, Limitations on the Right of Publicity, 28 BULL.
OF THE COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 111, 118 (1980) (right of publicity fosters "production of
intellectual and creative works by providing the financial incentive for individuals
to expend the time and resources necessary to produce them") [hereinafter Hoff-
man]; Horowitz, An Analysis of the Right of Publicity, 6 ART & THE LAW 39, 39
(1981) (protecting individual's investment in developing his identity by creation of
property right encourages people to develop skills necessary for public recognition,
resulting in individual creativity and cultural advancement) [hereinafter Horowitz].
The incentive for creativity argument stems from an analogy to copyright, another
branch of intellectual property. See Carson, 698 F.2d at 838 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(citing Hoffman, supra, at 118). Unlike a copyrightable work, however, a marketable
personality is usually the by-product-rather than the objective-of a creative effort.
See Memphis, 616 F.2d at 958. As judge Merritt stated in Memphis:
Although fame and stardom may be ends in themselves, they are normally
by-products of one's activities and personal attributes, as well as luck
and promotion. The basic motivations are the desire to achieve success
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policies." 7 First, by guaranteeing recompense for the commercial ex-
ploitation of an individual's persona, the right of publicity vindicates
the individual's natural right of property in the fruit of his labors."'
Thus, Brinkley alone deserves to profit from the marketable persona
she has developed over the years. Second, by prohibiting the misap-
propriation of a person's identity, the right prevents unjust enrichment
of infringers.II9 Otherwise, the opportunistic merchant could enjoy wind-
or excellence in a chosen field, the desire to contribute to the happiness
or improvement of one's fellows and the desire to receive the psychic
and financial rewards of achievement.
Id.
In an apparent analogy to trademark law, other commentators suggest that the
right of publicity serves to mitigate consumer confusion in advertising. See Hirsch,
90 Wis. 2d at 401, 280 N.W. at 139; Hoffman, supra, at 118; Treece, supra note
12, at 647. This assertion, however, in fact implicates common law trademark and
unfair competition laws rather than right of publicity law.
117. See Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215, 220-21 (2d Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979), rev'd on other grounds, 652 F.2d 278
(2d Cir. 1981); Cepeda, 415 F.2d at 1206; Price, 400 F. Supp. at 844; CAL. CrV.
CODE § 990(b) (West Supp. 1987); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.170(1) (Michie/
Bobbs-Merrill 1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-1103(a) (1984); cf. Lugosi v.
Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 819, 603 P.2d 425, 428, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323,
326 (1979) (en banc) (quoting W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 807 (4th ed. 1971)) (right
of publicity " 'is a right of value upon which plaintiff can capitalize by selling
licenses' ") (emphasis added).
118. See Bi-Rite Enters., 757 F.2d at 445 ("[iln the area of publicity rights
* the law must balance the competing goals . . . of facilitating public access to
valuable images ... and ... rewarding individual effort"); Carson, 698 F.2d at
837 (the identity of a celebrity "has a pecuniary value which the right of publicity
should vindicate"); Grant, 367 F. Supp. at 879 (" 'right of publicity' is somewhat
akin to the exclusive right of a commercial enterprise to the benefits to be derived
from the goodwill and secondary meaning that it has managed to build up in its
name"); Uhlaender, 316 F. Supp. at 1282 ("[a] celebrity must be considered to
have invested his years of practice and competition in a public personality which
eventually may reach marketable status. That identity, embodied in his name,
likeness, statistics and other personal characteristics, is the fruit of his labors and
is a type of property") (emphasis added); Nimmer, supra note 12, at 216 (courts
should recognize right of publicity lest "persons who have long and laboriously
nurtured the fruit of publicity values ... be deprived of them").
119. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576 (quoting Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law- Were Warren
and Brandeis Wrong? 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 331 (1966)) (justification
for protecting right of publicity " 'is the straightforward one of preventing unjust
enrichment by the theft of good will. No social purpose is served by having the
defendant get free some aspect of the plaintiff that would have market value and
for which he would normally pay' "); Carson, 698 F.2d at 837 ("[vlindication
of the right will also tend to prevent unjust enrichment by persons such as appellee
who seek commercially to exploit the identity of celebrities without their consent");
Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 652 F.2d 278, 289 (2d Cir. 1981) (Mansfield,
J., dissenting) (right of publicity "protects against the unauthorized appropriation
of an individual's very persona which would result in unearned commercial gain
RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
fall gains attributable, not to his own effort, but that of Brinkley.
Since the Haelan decision, commentators,'20 courts 2 and a few legisla-
tures'22 have elucidated the scope and limitations of the right of publicity.
While every person has a right of publicity,' 3 it is usually asserted by
one who has achieved "celebrity" status because without such renown,
damages-determined by the value of the misappropriation' 2 -are
to another"), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 927 (1982); Hoffman, supra note 116, at 118
(right of publicity serves society by preventing "unjust enrichment"); Note, The
Right of Publicity-Protection for Public Figures and Celebrities, 42 BROOKLYN L.
REv. 527, 527 (1976) ("claim founded upon the right of publicity acknowledges
the desire and need for publicity that inhere in most public figures, but seeks to
restrain a defendant from appropriating the pecuniary fruits of a public figure's
efforts to achieve recognition").
120. See supra note 12.
121. See supra note 10.
122. See supra note 11.
123. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540.08(1) (West 1972) (prohibiting unauthorized
exploitation of name or likeness "of any natural person") (emphasis added); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 47-25-1103(a) (1984) ("[every individual has a property right in the
use of his name, photograph or likeness in any medium in any manner") (emphasis
added); McLane, The Right of Publicity: Dispelling Survivability, Preemption and
First Amendment Myths Threatening to Eviscerate a Recognized State Right, 20
CAL. W.L. REv. 415, 417 (1984) (unfair not to compensate the unknown because
exploitation would not occur unless persona had some value); Nimmer, supra note
12, at 217 ("it would probably be preferable not to impose ,an arbitrary [celebrity]
limit on the right but rather to rely upon the rule of damages"); cf. Zacchini,
433 U.S. at 576 (" '[njo social purpose is served by having the defendant get free
some aspect of the plaintiff that would have market value and for which he would
normally pay' ") (citation omitted); T.J. Hooker v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc.,
551 F. Supp. 1060, 1062 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (if defendant had appropriated commercial
value of plaintiff woodcarver's name, he would have stated proper right of publicity
cause of action); Price, 400 F. Supp. at 847, quoted in Ali, 447 F. Supp. at 729
(stating that prominence should not effect waiver of right, and implying that right
exists regardless of celebrity status). But see Bi-Rite Enters., 757 F.2d at 442 ("well
known individuals [have a right] to control commercial exploitation of their names
and likenesses"); Memphis, 616 F.2d at 957 ("[tlhe famous have an exclusive legal
right during life to control and profit from the commercial use of their name and
personality"); Hoffman, The Right of Publicity: An Analytical Update, 14 INTELL.
PROP. L. REV. 1, 13-14 (1982) (prominence of plaintiff is threshold question in right
of publicity action); Simon, supra note 12, at 708 (same).
124. See Martin Luther King, 694 F.2d at 680 (value to user); Grant, 367 F. Supp.
at 881 (fair market value). Some statutes provide for the recovery of profits not
accounted for in the determination of actual damages. See CA. CrV. CODE § 990(a)
(West Supp. 1987); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-1106(d) (1984). The California statute
guarantees at least $750 to any plaintiff with a successful cause of action. CA. CrV.
CODE § 990(a) (West Supp. 1987). Several statutes also allow punitive damages. See,
e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540.08(2) (West 1972); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-40(A) (1984).
It should be noted that plaintiffs usually seek injunctions in addition to damages.
See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540.08(2) (West 1972); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-40(A) (1984).
Plaintiffs may, however, seek restitution as an alternative to damages. See Treece,
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inconsequential '25 In order to make this right valuable, '26 an individual
may assign his right of publicity to third parties with products or ser-
vices that would benefit from association with the individual.12 '
Acknowledging the right's proprietary nature,' 28 an increasing number
of jurisdictions now have a descendible right of publicity-that is, they
permit the celebrity's heirs to bring suit after his death. 29
Like the right of privacy, 30 however, the right of publicity fails
to safeguard an otherwise protectable identity when the value of
free expression outweighs the proprietary (or personal, in the case
of the right of privacy) interests at issue.' The first amendment
protects biography of public figures and commentary on newsworthy
supra note 12, at 648; see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1180 (5th ed. 1979). The
Tennessee statute even permits impoundment and destruction of offending materials.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-1106(b) to -1106(c) (1984).
125. See Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 824 n.11
(9th Cir. 1974) ("[glenerally, the greater the fame or notoriety of the identity
appropriated, the greater will be the extent of the economic injury suffered");
Nimmer, supra note 12, at 216.
126. See Haelan Laboratories, 202 F.2d at 868; Nimmer, supra note 12, at 209.
127. See, e.g., Bi-Rite Enters., 757 F.2d at 442; Cepeda, 415 F.2d at 1206; Haelan
Laboratories, 202 F.2d at 868; Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426, 430
(S.D.N.Y. 1978); Lugosi, 25 Cal. 3d at 824, 603 P.2d at 431, 160 Cal. Rptr. at
329 (case preempted by legislation creating a descendible right of publicity).
128. Compare Uhlaender, 316 F. Supp. at 1280 (right of publicity is property)
and Nimmer, supra note 12, at 216 (same) with Bi-Rite Enters., 757 F.2d at 442
(quoting PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 37, § 117, at 854) ("[i]t seems quite pointless
to dispute over whether such a right is to be classified as 'property'; it is at least
clearly proprietary in its nature. 'Once protected by law, it is a right of value upon
which the plaintiff can capitalize by selling licenses' ") and Haelan Laboratories,
202 F.2d at 868 (same).
129. See, e.g., Martin Luther King, 694 F.2d at 682 (certified questions answered
by Supreme Court of Georgia); Price, 400 F. Supp. at 844 (interpretation of New
York law by federal court); CAL. Crv. CODE § 990(b) (West Supp. 1987); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 540.08(1)(c) (West 1972); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 391.170(2) (Michie/Bobbs-
Merrill 1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-1103(b) (1984); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-40
(1984); see also Sims, supra note 12, at'453. But see Memphis, 616 F.2d at 959
(right of publicity not descendible); Lugosi, 25 Cal. 3d at 824, 603 P.2d at 431,
160 Cal. Rptr. at 329 (right of publicity not descendible without exploitation by the
decedent). It is significant, however, that these decisions relied in part on the fact
that the states whose law was at issue had not codified a descendible right of publicity
at that time. Subsequent passage of right of publicity statutes with descendibility
provisions by these states has weakened these decisions considerably. See CAL. Crv.
CODE § 990 (West Supp. 1987); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-1104 (1984).
130. Nimmer, supra note 12, at 216.
131. See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 574; Bi-Rite Enters., 757 F.2d at 445 (dictum);
Factors Etc., 652 F.2d at 288 (Mansfield, J., dissenting); Horowitz, supra note 116,
at 41.
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matters. 3 2 Consciously fictionalized accounts, in contrast, receive no
protection. "'
C. Comparison of New York's Right of Privacy Statute and the
Right of Publicity
This section contrasts New York's right of privacy statute with
the right of publicity. After examining the policies underlying the
statute and the right of publicity,'34 the section considers the applic-
ability of both to certain situations.'
1. Purpose of the Rights
In protecting a personal rather than a pecuniary interest, the right
of privacy differs fundamentally from the right of publicity. 3 6 New
York's right of privacy statute, however, contains language pro-
scribing the commercial appropriation of a person's name or pic-
ture. 3 7 Therefore, celebrities, who are particularly susceptible to
abuse of this nature, 3 ' have used the statute to remedy economic
harm. For example, in Brinkley v. Casablancas,3 9 the Appellate
Division, First Department, enjoined the defendant from marketing
132. Compare Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 574 (limiting right of publicity) and TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 47-25-1107(a) to -1107(b) (1984) (same) with Time, Inc. v. Hill,
385 U.S. 374, 383-84 (1967) (limiting right of privacy) and N.Y. Crv. RIGHTS LAW
§§ 50, 51 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1987) (same).
133. Compare Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 21 N.Y.2d 124, 127-29, 233 N.E.2d
840, 842-43, 286 N.Y.S.2d 832, 834-35 (1967) (applying first amendment exemptions
noted in Spahn, which construed New York's right of privacy statute, to right of
publicity), quoted in Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426, 430-31 (S.D.N.Y.
1978) with Time, 385 U.S. at 384 (right of privacy).
134. See infra notes 136-43 and accompanying text.
135. See infra notes 144-96 and accompanying text.
136. See Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836, 843 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
("protection from intrusion upon an individual's privacy, on the one hand, and pro-
tection from appropriation of some element of an individual's personality for com-
mercial exploitation, on the other hand, are different in theory and in scope"); see
also supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text. But see Hicks, 464 F. Supp. at 430
("rights of privacy and . . . publicity are intertwined due to the similarity between
the nature of the interests protected by each").
137. N.Y. Cirv. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50, 51 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1987).
138. See, e.g., Brinkley v. Casablancas, 80 A.D.2d 428, 444, 438 N.Y.S.2d 1004,
1014 (1st Dep't 1981) (fashion model obtained injunction and damages against
distributor who sold posters of model without her consent); Onassis v. Christian
Dior-New York, Inc., 122 Misc. 2d 603, 616, 472 N.Y.S.2d 254, 263 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1984) (court enjoined use and distribution of magazine advertisement
picturing model who was plaintiff's look-alike).
139. 80 A.D.2d 428, 438 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (1st Dep't 1981).
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unauthorized posters of Christie Brinkley, and awarded damages to
the model under the New York right of privacy statute.140 Brinkley
had used the statute to protect a pecuniary, not a personal, interest:
concern about market saturation and poor marketing affecting her
future earnings potential motivated the action. 41 Thus, although
recovery under the statute satisfied the plaintiff involved, the recovery
rested on an inapposite theory. 42 In sum, a statute designed to
ameliorate emotional injury is now often pressed to remedy economic
harm. 143
2. Scope of Protection
Not only does current use of New York's right of privacy statute
fail to comport with its purpose,' 44 but the language of the statute
inadequately remedies the abuses to which plaintiffs direct such use. 45
The privacy statute, which encompasses "name, portrait or pic-
ture,'"146 covers only a limited portion of persona. Generally, only
full names are protected, 47 although a surname alone may qualify
if it has become associated with an individual. 41 Indeed, without
unequivocal identification with a person, even a full name may go
without protection. 49 While strict construction of the statute usually
140. Id. at 442, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 1013.
141. See id. at 430-31, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 1006.
142. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
143. See id.
144. See supra notes 136-43 and accompanying text.
145. See N.Y. Cirv. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50, 51 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1987); see
also infra notes 146-85 and accompanying text.
146. N.Y. Crv. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50, 51 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1987) (reprinted
supra notes 94, 97).
147. See Allen v. Gordon, 86 A.D.2d 514, 515, 446 N.Y.S.2d 48, 50 (1st Dep't
1982) (naming character in book "Dr. Allen" permitted); Pfaudler v. Pfaudler
Co., 114 Misc. 477, 478, 186 N.Y.S. 725, 726 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1921)(" 'name' as used in the statute must mean a person's full name"). But see Orsini
v. Eastern Wine Corp., 190 Misc. 235, 236, 73 N.Y.S.2d 426, 427 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1947) (use of surname in conjunction with family coat of arms enjoined),
aff'd, 273 A.D. 947, 78 N.Y.S.2d 224 (1st Dep't 1948).
148. See Adrian v. Unterman, 281 A.D. 81, 88, 118 N.Y.S.2d 121, 127 (1st
Dep't 1952) (court protects against use of name of famous women's dress designer
named "Adrian"), aff'd, 306 N.Y. 771, 118 N.E.2d 477 (1954).
149. See Nebb v. Bell Syndicate, Inc., 41 F. Supp. 929, 930 (S.D.N.Y. 1941)(suit by Mr. and Mrs. Rudy Nebb to enjoin defendant's publication of cartoon
with similarly-named characters dismissed because defendant did not trade on
secondary meaning or reputation of plaintiffs' names); People ex rel. Maggio v.
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blocks actions based on the appropriation of an assumed name or
nickname, 150 the courts will not block an action when the public
has come to associate the new name with the individual. 5 ' Therefore,
because society failed to identify a particular individual as "Dr.
Seuss," a court refused to protect the well-known pseudonym. 5 2 In
addition, the statute does not extend to business, corporate or part-
nership names.'53
The phrase "portrait or picture" has received a somewhat broader
interpretation than the term "name."' 15 4 Although the portrait or
picture used need not be exact,' mere word portraits are not
actionable. 5 6 Other representations, such as drawings, sculptures and
Charles Scribner's Sons, 205 Misc. 818, 822, 130 N.Y.S.2d 514, 519 (N.Y.C. Magis.
Ct. Kings County 1954) (use of character named "Angelo Maggio" in "From Here
to Eternity" did not violate Joseph Anthony Maggio's right of privacy, although
like character, he was stationed in Hawaii during World War II); Swacker v.
Wright, 154 Misc. 822, 823, 277 N.Y.S. 296, 298 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1935)
(mere use, without particular identification, of "Frank Swacker" in cast of characters
and "Swacker" in text of book permissible).
150. See Geisel v. Poynter Prods., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 331, 355 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)
(no cause of action for exploitation of "Dr. Seuss" because statute "does not
protect an assumed or trade name"); Maggio, 205 Misc. at 822, 130 N.Y.S.2d at
519 (statute "does not protect a nickname known to a few intimates").
151. See Gardella v. Log Cabin Prods. Co., 89 F.2d 891, 894 (2d Cir. 1937)
("Aunt Jemima" is protected by statute because "stage name has come to be
closely and widely identified with the person who bears it"). The court's language
on this issue is dictum, however, because it subsequently held the statute inapplicable
to the case due to previous trademark ownership of the name. See id.
152. See Geisel, 295 F. Supp. at 355-56.
153. See Davis v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc., 16 F. Supp. 195, 196 (S.D.N.Y.
1936); Shubert v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 189 Misc. 734, 742, 72 N.Y.S.2d 851,
858 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1947); Jaccard v. R.H. Macy & Co., 176 Misc. 88,
89, 26 N.Y.S.2d 829, 830 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1941), aff'd, 265 A.D. 15, 37
N.Y.S.2d 570 (1st Dep't 1942). But cf. Cornell Univ. v. Messing Bakeries, Inc.,
285 A.D. 490, 492, 138 N.Y.S.2d 280, 282 (3d Dep't) ("educational institution which
has won large public prestige [need not] ... have that prestige diluted by a commer-
cial use of its name") (case decided under law of trademark and unfair competition
without mention of privacy statute), aff'd, 309 N.Y. 722, 128 N.E.2d 421 (1955).
154. N.Y. Crv. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50, 51 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1987).
155. See Cohen v. Herbal Concepts, Inc., 100 A.D.2d 175, 179, 473 N.Y.S.2d
426, 429 (1st Dep't) (phrase "does not require that there be an identifiable facial
representation .... [but] includes any representation of the person"), aff'd, 63
N.Y.2d 379, 472 N.E.2d 307, 482 N.Y.S.2d 457 (1984); Loftus v. Greenwich
Lithographing Co., 192 A.D. 251, 256, 182 N.Y.S. 428, 431 (1st Dep't 1920)
(portrait appearing in advertising matter protected under statute, although not exact
reproduction); Onassis, 122 Misc. 2d at 611, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 261 (phrase encom-
passes "not only actuality, but the close and purposeful resemblance to reality").
156. Toscani v. Hersey, 271 A.D. 445, 448, 65 N.Y.S.2d 814, 817 (1st Dep't
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mannequins, may be protected.'57 Nonetheless, protection requires
recognizability of the plaintiff as the individual portrayed 5 ' and
intent by the defendant to exploit plaintiff's likeness. 15 9 Moreover,
even if the defendant purposefully exploits the likeness of a suffi-
ciently identifiable plaintiff, the phrase permits such use when it is
"incidental" to advertising.'6°
The right of publicity, on the other hand, provides greater pro-
tection of a plaintiff's name, portrait or picture. The right protects
nicknames,' 16 business names 162 and personal names, regardless of
particular identification with a person. 63 Moreover, the right of
publicity extends protection to aspects of persona entirely beyond
1946). Contra Levey v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 57 F. Supp. 40, 42 (S.D.N.Y. 1944)
(dictum).
157. See Young v. Greneker Studios, Inc., 175 Misc. 1027, 1028, 26 N.Y.S.2d
357, 358-59 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1941) (in view of definitions of "portrait" as
carved or molded figure, statue, sculpture, visible representation or likeness, image,
copy, and likeness of individual produced by art, as in oils, water-color, crayon,
engraving, photography or sculpture, the court held that a picture or portrait "is
not necessarily a photograph ... [of a] person, but includes any representation
of ... [a] person . . . , whether by photograph, painting or sculpture").
158. Allen v. National Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (ex-
ploitation of photograph gives rise to cause of action when court can conclude,
as matter of law, "that most persons who could identify an actual photograph of
[the celebrity] would be likely to think that [it] was actually his picture") (dictum
because court ultimately decided case under law of unfair competition and trade-
marks); Negri v. Schering Corp., 333 F. Supp. 101, 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (for valid
cause of action, "picture used must be a clear representation of the plaintiff,
recognizable from the advertisement itself"); Levey, 57 F. Supp. at 42 (statute
"require[s] a clear representation of a person").
159. Compare Galella v. Onassis, 353 F. Supp. 196, 233 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (pho-
tographer's use of celebrity's photograph on Christmas cards photographer sent to
his editors violated statute), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 487
F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973) with Freed v. Loew's Inc., 175 Misc. 616, 617-18, 24
N.Y.S.2d 679, 680-81 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1940) (artist's poster, which improved
on physique and features of plaintiff model with no intention of exhibiting plaintiff,
not actionable under statute).
160. Booth v. Curtis Publishing Co., 15 A.D.2d 343, 350, 223 N.Y.S.2d 737,
744 (1st Dep't) ("so long as the reproduction was used to illustrate the quality
and content of the periodical in which it originally appeared, the statute was not
violated, albeit the reproduction appeared in other media for purposes of advertising
the periodical"), aff'd, 11 N.Y.2d 907, 182 N.E.2d 812, 228 N.Y.S.2d 468 (1962),
quoted in Namath v. Sports Illustrated, 48 A.D.2d 487, 488, 371 N.Y.S.2d 10, 12
(1st Dep't 1975), aff'd, 39 N.Y.2d 897, 352 N.E.2d 584, 386 N.Y.S.2d 397 (1976).
161. See Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 90 Wis. 2d 379, 403, 280 N.W.2d
129, 140 (1979) ("Crazylegs").
162. See Martin Luther King, Jr., Center for Social Change, Inc. v. American
Heritage Prods., Inc., 694 F.2d 674, 683 (11th Cir. 1983) ("Martin Luther King,
Jr., Center for Social Change, Inc.").
163. See supra notes 100-103 and accompanying text.
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the statute: voice, i64 style 6 and personal attributes. 166
3. Nature of Exploitation Prohibited
The right of privacy statute bars a specific type of exploitation,
namely exploitation "for advertising purposes, or for the purposes
of trade.' 67 Although "advertising purposes," connoting solicitation
of patronage,' 6s receives a broader reading than "purposes of trade,' 69
164. See CAL. Cw. CODE § 990 (West Supp. 1987) (voice protected); cf. Sinatra
v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711, 716 (9th Cir. 1970) (in case decided
on unfair competition grounds but implicating right of publicity, court denied
protection of plaintiff singer's voice but implied that result would have differed
had plaintiff's "sound [been] uniquely personal," i.e., had no copyright inhered
in music and lyrics owned by third party), cert. denied,, 402 U.S. 906 (1971); Lahr
v. Adell Chem. Co., 300 F.2d 256, 260 (1st Cir. 1962) (in case based on unfair
competition but essentially implicating right of publicity, court vacated judgment
below dismissing complaint for infringement of actor's distinctive vocal style); Booth
v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 362 F. Supp. 343, 347 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (court implied
that commercial using imitation of Shirley Booth's voice would be actionable if it
used her name or likeness to identify her as voice of fictional television character
she portrayed).
165. See Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 835 (6th
Cir. 1983) ("[i]f the celebrity's identity is commercially exploited, there has been
an invasion of his right whether or not his' 'name or likeness' is used") (emphasis
added); Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 827 (9th Cir.
1974) (although plaintiff's physical features not identifiable in television commercial
exhibiting race car with distinctive styling of the one ordinarily driven by plaintiff,
commercial could be enjoined because viewers would associate car with plaintiff);
Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane & Bernbach, Inc., 58 A.D.2d 620, 622, 396 N.Y.S.2d
661, 665 (2d Dep't 1977) (automobile commercial on television against New Year's
Eve party backdrop, including actor conducting band and using same gestures, musical
beat and choice of music with which plaintiff had become associated in public's
mind, held actionable).
166. See Groucho Marx Prods., Inc. v. Day & Night Co., 523 F. Supp. 485,
494 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (character with cigar, mustache and thick eyebrows), rev'd
on other grounds, 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982); Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F.
Supp. 1277, 1282 (D. Minn. 1970) (batting and fielding statistics of baseball players);
Palmer v. Schonhorn Enters., Inc., 96 N.J. Super. 72, 79-80, 232 A.2d 458, 462
(1967) (factual profiles of golfers).
167. N.Y. Crv. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50, 51 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1987).
168. Lerman v. Flynt Distrib. Co., 745 F.2d 123, 130 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
471 U.S. 1054 (1985) (quoting Ginsberg v. News Group Publications, 9 Media L.
Rep. (BNA) 2014, 2016 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1983)); Pagan v. New York
Herald Tribune, Inc., 32 A.D.2d 341, 342-43, 301 N.Y.S.2d 120, 122-23 (1st Dep't
1969), aff'd, 26 N.Y.2d 941, 258 N.E.2d 727, 310 N.Y.S.2d 327 (1970); Lahiri v.
Daily Mirror, 162 Misc. 776, 780, 295 N.Y.S. 382, 386 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1937).
169. Manger v. Kree Inst. of Electrolysis, Inc., 233 F.2d 5, 9 (2d Cir. 1956)
("advertising purposes" in section 50 is broader than "purposes of trade" in section
51); see Selsman v. Universal Photo Books, Inc., 18 A.D.2d 151, 152, 238 N.Y.S.2d
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in essence the phrases contemplate commercial exploitation'7 ° and
exclude non-commercial appropriation. 7' The right of publicity, on
the other hand, affords individuals protection from all exploitation
of their personas,'7 2 provided that the exploitation is not privileged.'
Therefore, non-profit uses that would be actionable under the right
of publicity-for example, a charity making and selling a Paul
Newman poster without his consent-escape legal sanction of the
privacy statute. 74
4. Transferability of the Rights
The right of privacy, entirely statutory in New York, 75 contains
686, 687 (1st Dep't 1963) (with regard to "uses for advertising purposes," section
50 is to be construed liberally).
170. See Barrows v. Rozansky, 111 A.D.2d 105, 106, 489 N.Y.S.2d 481, 484
(1st Dep't 1985) ("only judicially recognized relief for invasion of privacy in New
York is the protection afforded the commercial misappropriation of a person's
name or picture"); Davis v. High Soc'y Magazine, Inc., 90 A.D.2d 374, 378, 457
N.Y.S.2d 308, 312 (2d Dep't 1982) ("only the commercial use of a person's name
or likeness without permission is prohibited"); D'Agostino v. Pan American World
Airways, Inc., 79 A.D.2d 646, 647, 433 N.Y.S.2d 823, 824 (2d Dep't 1980) ("New
York recognizes no right to judicial relief for the invasion of privacy beyond
protection from ... commercial misappropriation").
171. See Cardy v. Maxwell, 9 Misc. 2d 329, 331-32, 169 N.Y.S.2d 547, 551
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1957) (statute, protecting right of privacy in certain situations,
is "aimed at exploitation for purposes of commerce. Being partly penal, its scope
must be strictly construed and may not be enlarged to include any unauthorized
use with a mercenary motive") (emphasis added).
172. See supra note 102.
173. See supra notes 130-33 and accompanying text.
174. Analogous cases illustrate this point. Compare Davis v. Duryea, 99 Misc.
2d 933, 940, 417 N.Y.S.2d 624, 629 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1979) ("use of a
photograph or public personage's name in any appropriate form during a political
campaign is a constitutionally protected activity" that does not violate right of
privacy statute) with State ex rel. LaFollette v. Hinkle, 131 Wash. 86, 93, 229 P.
317, 319 (1924) (court enjoined unauthorized use of political candidate's "valuable"
name for political party allegedly espousing his views). See also Griffin v. Harris
Beach, 112 A.D.2d 514, 516, 490 N.Y.S.2d 919, 921 (3d Dep't 1985) (permitted
use of individual's name as plaintiff in federal court action brought to defeat plan
for use of federal funds to finance hotel project); McGraw v. Watkins, 49 A.D.2d
958, 959, 373 N.Y.S.2d 663, 665 (3d Dep't 1975) (court denied injunction against
publication of nude photograph of plaintiff because plaintiff had failed to allege
commercial use thereof); Wallace v. Weiss, 82 Misc. 2d 1053, 1055, 372 N.Y.S.2d
416, 420 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1975) (court allowed free distribution of non-
profit student magazine with picture of plaintiff that had no connection to ad-
vertisement).
175. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
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several gaps. It is a personal right 176 incapable of assignment 177 or
inheritance. 78 Furthermore, relatives of a New Yorker cannot enforce
his right of privacy through a derivative action. 179 Surprisingly,
however, the courts may enforce a contract made for the use of a
decedent's name in favor of the survivor. 180
The right of publicity, on the other hand, is assignable,' 8' and
courts have increasingly recognized it as descendible. 18 2 Without as-
signability, the value of a right to exploit one's name or picture is
greatly reduced. 8 3 In addition, descendibility vindicates the rights of
those, like Martin Luther King, who consciously avoided exploitation
of their valuable personas during their lives'8 and those, like Bela
Lugosi, who had planned subsequent exploitation of their rights of
publicity but died unexpectedly. 8
In sum, New York's right of privacy statute contains gaps that
176. See, e.g., Runyon v. United States, 281 F.2d 590, 592 (1960); Haelan
Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953); Bowman Gum, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.,
103 F. Supp. 944, 953 (E.D.N.Y. 1952); Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House,
Inc., 58 Misc. 2d 1, 7, 294 N.Y.S.2d 122, 129 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1968), aff'd
mem., 32 A.D.2d 892, 301 N.Y.S.2d 948 (1st Dep't 1969); Savell, supra note 46, at 38.
177. See Haelan Laboratories, 202 F.2d at 868; Price, 400 F. Supp. at 844; Brinkley,
80 A.D.2d at 436, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 1010; Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane & Bernbach,
Inc., 58 A.D.2d 620, 621, 396 N.Y.S.2d 661, 664 (2d Dep't 1977); Rosemont Enters.,
58 Misc. 2d at 7, 294 N.Y.S.2d at 129; Savell, supra note 46, at 38.
178. See Runyon, 281 F.2d at 592; Brinkley v. Casablancas, 80 A.D.2d 428, 436,
438 N.Y.S.2d 1004, 1010 (1st Dep't 1981); Lombardo, 58 A.D.2d at 621, 396 N.Y.S.2d
at 664; Savell, supra note 46, at 38.
179. See Schuyler v. Curtis, 147 N.Y. 434, 451, 42 N.E. 22, 27 (1895); Russell
v. Marlboro Books, 18 Misc. 2d 166, 189, 183 N.Y.S.2d 8, 34 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1959); Savell, supra note 46, at 38.
180. See Lunceford v. Wilcox, 88 N.Y.S.2d 225, 228 (N.Y.C. Ct. N.Y. County
1949). But cf. Runyon, 281 F.2d at 592 (holding that son of deceased person has
no right to assign his father's right of privacy but failing to nullify contract).
181. See, e.g.., Martin Luther King, Jr., Center For Social Change, Inc. v. American
Heritage Prods., Inc., 694 F.2d 674, 680 (11th Cir. 1983); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Creative
Card Co., 444 F. Supp. 279, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); see supra note 127 and accompany-
ing text.
182. See supra note 129.
183. See supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
184. Martin Luther King, 694 F.2d at 683; Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp.
876, 880 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (right of publicity protects living plaintiff who chooses
not to exploit his persona).
185. Cf. Palmer v. Schonhorn Enters., Inc., 96 N.J. Super. 72, 79, 232 A.2d
458, 462 (1967) (prominent individuals "may not all desire to capitalize upon their
names in the commercial field, beyond or apart from that in which they have
reached their known excellence. However, because they presently do not should
not be justification for others to do so because of the void").
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leave worthy plaintiffs without redress.'16 Drafted over eighty years
ago1 7 to address the situation presented by Roberson in which the
plaintiff's picture is used for advertising without his consent,' 8 the
language inadequately remedies the abuses to which plaintiffs now
direct it.19 Strict construction of the statute' 90 further constrains its
application. ,91
In contrast, the right of publicity would provide broader protection
to citizens of New York by filling these gaps.' 92 The state should
not redress economic harm with a statute enacted to protect an
individual's feelings, when another doctrine, the right of publicity,
directly addresses the situation. 93 As a practical matter, the law
should protect aspects of persona, such as nickname, voice, style
and personal attributes, whose misappropriation has commercial ram-
ifications. 9 4 Similarly, the law should prevent not-for-profit exploi-
tations because they also diminish future earnings potential by
saturating the market.' 95 Most importantly, like all other forms of
property, the proprietary interest a person has in his persona should
be assignable and descendible.' 96
III. Recognition of a Common' Law Right of Publicity in New
York
The existence of worthy plaintiffs without remedies' 97 and the
186. See supra notes 144-85 and accompanying text.
187. 1903 N.Y. Laws ch. 132, §§ 1-2 (now, as amended, N.Y. Crv. RIGHTS LAW
§ 50, 51 (West 1976 & Supp. 1987)).
188. See Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442
(1902); see also supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 144-85 and accompanying text.
190. See Ann-Margret v. High Soc'y Magazine, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 401, 404
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (statute construed strictly to avoid conflict with dissemination of
information protected by first amendment); Arrington v. New York Times Co.,
55 N.Y.2d 433, 439, 434 N.E.2d 1319, 1321, 449 N.Y.S.2d 941, 943 (1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1146 (1983) (statute construed strictly to follow legislative intent
of limiting scope of protection to Roberson-type situation); Onassis v. Christian
Dior-New York, Inc., 122 Misc. 2d 603, 607, 472 N.Y.S.2d 254, 258 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1984) (statute construed strictly in recognition that statutory right is
in derogation of common law). But see Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 381-82
(1967) (statute applies to situations beyond the facts of Roberson although first
amendment limits its application).
191. See infra notes 220-30 and accompanying text.
192. See infra notes 234-37 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 136-43 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 144-66 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 167-74 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 175-85 and accompanying text.




confusion from unsettled law in the field1 98 demonstrate the need
for New York courts to acknowledge a right of publicity. While
scholars commenting on the right in general have suggested state' 99
or federal200 legislation, others indicate that the Copyright Act of
1976 pre-empts much right-of-publicity law.20 ' A discussion of these
propositions exceeds the scope of this Note. Rather, this Note now
addresses the propriety of judicial recognition of a common law202
right of publicity in New York. 203 After briefly discussing the history
of judge-made law, this section considers the amenability of the
right of publicity to common law creation in New York. The section
concludes with an analysis and refutation of arguments opposing
judicial lawmaking as a general proposition.
A. History of Judge-Made Law
The courts have significantly influenced the evolution of our law. 204
Indeed, until this century, the judiciary dominated lawmaking. 205 The
198. See supra notes 21-28 and accompanying text.
199. See Sims, supra note 12, at 455 n.16 (focusing on survivability issue).
200. See Simon, supra note 12, at 755; see also Sims, supra note 12, at 455.
201. See Shipley, Publicity Never Dies, It Just Fades Away: The Right of Publicity
and Federal Preemption, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 673 (1981); Note, Copyright and
the Right of Publicity: One Pea in Two Pods?, 71 GEO. L.J. 1567 (1983).
202. For the purposes of this Note, the phrase "common law" does not refer
to constitutional adjudication or statutory interpretation; rather, "common law"
refers to non-constitutional decisional law in areas not considered by the legislature.
203. The judiciary complements, rather than competes with, the legislature. See
Breitel, The Lawmakers, 65 COLUM L. REV. 749, 759 (1965) [hereinafter Breitel
I]; Hart, Comment on Paper Delivered by Charles D. Breitel entitled The Courts
and Lawmaking, in LEGAL INSTITUTIONS TODAY AND ToMORROw 40 (Paulsen ed.
1959) [hereinafter Hart, Comment]. As a result of this complementary relationship,
even judicial action on the right of publicity that stirs a legislative response may
be appropriate. See Note, Publicity as an Aspect of Privacy and Personal Autonomy,
55 S. CAL. L. REV. 727, 761-68 (1982) (advocating judicial recognition of right of
publicity).
204. The powerful effect of judges on the law, viewed with apprehension in the
Reagan era, has a long history in the United States. "From 1800 on, strong-minded
American judges, whose work was recorded, influenced their courts and the law."
L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 135 (2d ed. 1985) [hereinafter FRIED-
MAN, ANmRICAN LAW]. According to another authority, "[a] hundred years ago,
case law was-or seemed-the dominant ingredient of American law, and legislation
of only secondary importance." H. JONES, J. KERNOCHAN & A. MURPHY, LEGAL
METHOD CASES AND TEXT MATERIALS 2 (1980) [hereinafter JONES, LEGAL METHOD]. In
describing post-revolutionary American jurisprudence, another scholar stated that
"[tihe federal Congress did little; the state legislatures did less. The judges became
our preferred problem-solvers." G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 35-36(1977) [hereinafter GILMORE, AGES OF AMERICAN LAW].
205. See G. CALABREsI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 1 (1982)
[hereinafter CALABRESI, AGE OF STATUTES].
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opinions of Justice Cardozo, especially those written as a member
of New York's Court of Appeals, powerfully illustrate the impact
judges have had on the development of the law. 206 Justice Holmes
even went so far as to assert that the only law was what the court
decided. 20 7
Holmes' exuberance notwithstanding, the judiciary as an institution
has performed in a more conservative manner. 201 Its role was, and
remains today, to adjudicate disputes unresolvable by private means,M
through pre-existing and reasonably knowable rules. 210 The courts
balance "the competing values of stability in the law, served by
adherence to precedent, and responsiveness to social change, which
may call for the abandonment of an outworn legal doctrine. ' 21 In
practice, courts accomplish their task in two ways: (1) interpreting
statutes; and (2) making common law.212
Today, many legislatures, 23 including that of New York,214 convene
206. See, e.g., Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928)
(negligence); MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916)
(products liability).
207. See Holmes, The Path of The Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461 (1897)
("[tihe prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious,
are what I mean by the law").
208. See infra notes 209-12 and accompanying text.
209. See H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 185 (1958) [hereinafter HART & SACKS, LEGAL
PROCESS]; Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards:
Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 227, 235 (1973) (case law arises
when judges decide controversies) [hereinafter Wellington]; cf JONES, LEGAL METHOD,
supra note 204, at 3.
210. See Wellington, supra note 209, at 235; cf. CALABRESI, AGE OF STATUTES,
supra note 205, at 164.
211. JONES, LEGAL METHOD, supra note 204, at 4.
212. HART & SACKS, LEGAL PROCESS, supra note 209, at 366-68.
213. For example, the United States Congress assembles annually on January 3,
unless Congress "shall by law appoint a different day." U.S. CONST. amend. XX,
§ 2. In recent years, Congress has remained in session almost the entire year. See
1987-1988 OFFICIAL CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTORY: 100TH CONGRESS, GOVERNMENT
PRINTING OFFICE 670-71 (1987) (table presenting duration of recent sessions) [here-
inafter CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTORY].
Durational limits on state legislative sessions were eased during the 1960s and
1970s. See Pound, The State Legislatures, in THE BOOK OF THE STATES, THE COUNCIL
OF STATE GOVERNMENTS 77 (1986). Although the trend has stopped, see id., "[tihe
legislatures of California, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New York,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin have lengthy sessions." Id.; see THE BOOK OF
THE STATES, THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS 83-85 (1986) (tables indicating
that sessions of these states are unlimited) [hereinafter BOOK OF STATES].
214. Every year, the New York State Legislature convenes "on the first Wednesday
following the first Monday in January." N.Y. CONST. art. XIII, § 4. The legislature
"remains in session until it has concluded its business." THE NEW YORK RED BOOK
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year-round. As a result, federal and state law has undergone "sta-
tutorification. ' 21 5 Despite the proliferation of statutes, legal problems
amenable to judge-made solutions remain. To establish a principle
that courts should confine their activity to statutory interpretation
would be futile. 216 The courts do make law today, 217 perhaps more
a result of, than in spite of, the proliferation of statutes. 218 As the
Supreme Court recently observed, "state courts ... are general
common law courts and . . . possess a general power to develop
and apply their own rules of decision. '21 9
B. A Common Law Right of Publicity in New York
In Martin Luther King, Jr., Center for Social Change, Inc. v.
American Heritage Products, Inc. ,220 the heirs of the late reverend
and a non-profit corporation, the assignee of the right to use his
name or likeness and certain of his copyrights, sued to enjoin an
opportunistic merchant from distributing miniature plastic busts of
the leader without consent. 221 In answer to certified questions from
the Eleventh Circuit, the Georgia Supreme Court recognized a com-
mon law right of publicity that descends222 without exploitation by
31 (G. Mitchell ed. 1987-1988) [hereinafter THE RED BOOK]. In recent years, the
legislature has required the whole year for this task. See id. at 94 (table presenting
duration of recent sessions); see also MANUAL FOR THE USE OF THE LEGISLATURE
OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 1982-83, 884 (1982-83) (same).
215. CALABRESI, AGE OF STATUTES, supra note 205, at 1 (citing with approval
GILMORE, AGES OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 204, at 95 ("orgy of statute making"));
JONES, LEGAL METHOD, supra note 204, at 3 ("legislation has fully come of age
as a form of American law").
216. See Friedmann, Legal Philosophy and Judicial Lawmaking, 61 COLUM. L.
REV. 821, 839 (1961) [hereinafter Friedmann]; see also Traynor, Comment on Paper
Delivered by Charles D. Breitel entitled The Courts and Lawmaking, in LEGAL
INSTITUTIONS TODAY AND TOMORROW 52 (Paulsen ed. 1959) ("wide agreement [now
exists] that a judge can and should participate creatively in the development of
the common law") [hereinafter Traynor, Comment].
217. Commentators agree on this point. "It is now a commonplace that courts,
not only of common-law jurisdiction but also those which have codified statutory
law as their base, participate in the lawmaking process." Breitel I, supra note 203,
at 765. "Courts, too, have their distinctive contributions to make" in the devel-
opment of the law. Hart, Comment, supra note 203, at 40.
218. See Traynor, Statutes Revolving in Common-Law Orbits, 17 CATH. U.L.
REV. 401, 401 (1968) (as statutorification has brought an increasing number of
areas within the regulation of necessarily broad statutes, "[tihe old saying that a
judge's word is law now has fresh validity. A modern judge has the last word in
a steadily widening area of unprecedented controversies") [hereinafter Traynor].
219. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 312 (1981).
220. 694 F.2d 674 (l1th Cir. 1983).
221. Id. at 675.
222. Id. at 682.
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the decedent during his lifetime. 223 Thus, the court reversed the
judgment of the district court in favor of the defendant and remanded
the case for further proceedings, including the assessment of
damages. 224 In New York, however, the plaintiff's cause of action
would fail. First, the scope of the right of privacy statute does not
include statuettes. 225 Indeed, unauthorized use of King's distinctive
voice in a radio advertisement would also elude sanction in New
York.226 Second, and more importantly, the statute protects against
the exploitation of living persons only. 227 Thus, though King chose
not to exploit the image he created, 228 had he planned to bequeath
a valuable right of publicity to his relatives, 229 New York law would
not vindicate this desire. 230 Because of its huge media industry23' and
concomitantly large number of recognizable figures, New York
should protect the commercial interest these individuals have in the
marketing of their images. Nonetheless, even the most worthy plain-
tiff receives no protection from opportunistic New York retailers.
Having demonstrated that the right of privacy statute leaves badly
harmed plaintiffs remediless, the final inquiry concerns the propriety
of judicial acknowledgement of a common law right of publicity in
New York. Like private law in general, 232 and tort law in particular,233
the right of publicity is an appropriate subject for judicial lawmaking.
The recognition in New York of such a right-which protects not
only name and picture but all aspects of persona2 4 from both
commercial and non-commercial exploitation 23 5 and is both assignable
and descendible236-would fill gaps in the state's right of privacy
statute. 237 Interstitial lawmaking, such as that implicated by recog-
223. Id. at 683.
224. Id. at 675, 680.
225. See supra notes 154-66 and accompanying text.
226. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
227. See N.Y. CIv. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50, 51 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1987).
228. See Martin Luther King, Jr., Center For Social Change, Inc. v. American
Heritage Prods., Inc., 694 F.2d 674, 683 (l1th Cir. 1983).
229. Cf. id. at 675 (King did assign rights to several of his copyrighted speeches).
230. See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
231. See Savell, supra note 46, at 3 n.5. See generally 100 Largest Media
Companies, Advertising Age, June 27, 1985, passim.
232. Cf. JONES, LEGAL METHOD, supra note 204, at 2.
233. See Friedmann, supra note 216, at 839 (noting amenability of family and
criminal law, and especially tort law, to common law development).
234. See supra notes 146-66 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 167-74 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 175-85 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 146-96 and accompanying text.
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nition of the right of publicity in New York, is a proper judicial
activity which does not usurp the legislature's prerogative. 23
Furthermore, the right of publicity possesses certain characteristics
that make it particularly well-suited for recognition at common law.
Judge-made law is appropriate when the legal landscape merits a
new rule whose articulation does not strain the court's competence. 23 9
In New York, worthy plaintiffs need relief that the courts can
articulate without special expertise. 240
Indeed, New York's judiciary may have already recognized the
right implicitly.24' In Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane & Bernbach, Inc. ,242
for instance, the Second Department of the Appellate Division held
that the plaintiff had a valid cause of action for the exploitation
of his style under the common law, although he had no action under
the privacy statute.243 In Madison Square Garden Corp. v. Universal
Pictures Company," the first department seemed to recognize pub-
licity rights in an action for unfair competition when it stated, "the
complaint sufficiently alleges a misappropriation of plaintiff's prop-
erty rights.' ' 24 And in Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc. ,246 Judge Des-
238. In many areas, it is still proper for the courts to adjust the rights and
liabilities of litigants to changing conditions. See Friedmann, supra note 216, at
841 ("large groups" of such cases); see also CALABRESI, AGE OF STATUTES, supra
note 205, at 163 ("fair number" of such cases may remain). In general, the courts
should focus their activity on interstitial areas, deciding whether to fill legislative
gaps, extend statutes or retain existing law. See Friedmann, supra note 216, at
837. But see Breitel I, supra note 203, at 769 (several reasons "make for a strong
lawmaking function in the courts, far beyond the interstitial and gap-filling")
(emphasis added).
239. See CALABRESI, AGE OF STATUTES, supra note 205, at 163 ("[it will occur
in areas in which the new rule to be promulgated is clearly mandated by the legal
landscape and in which a statement of the rule does not involve detailed language
and technical data beyond a court's competence"); cf. Friedmann, supra note 216,
at 841 ("courts are neither equipped nor called upon to undertake" lawmaking in
areas requiring "comprehensive administrative arrangements"). Thus, the courts
should ordinarily demur from lawmaking when the issue is particularly complex,
especially if it requires technical expertise. See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451
U.S. 304, 325 (1981). But see id. at 349 & n.25 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (complexity
"is hardly a suitable basis for denying ... courts the power to adjudicate").
240. See supra notes 145-96 and accompanying text.
241. See Nimmer, supra note 12, at 218-23 (discussing several New York cases
purportedly recognizing right of publicity).
242. 58 A.D.2d 620, 396 N.Y.S.2d 661 (2d Dep't 1977).
243. See id. at 622, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 664-65 (televised car commercial presented
against New Year's Eve party backdrop, including actor conducting band and using
same gestures, musical beat and choice of music with which plaintiff had become
associated in mind of public held actionable under common law).
244. 255 A.D. 459, 7 N.Y.S.2d 845 (1st Dep't 1938).
245. Id. at 464, 7 N.Y.S.2d at 850.
246. 304 N.Y. 354, 107 N.E.2d 485 (1952).
1987]
FORDHAM URBAN LA W JOURNAL
mond's concurrence to an opinion denying plaintiff protection under
New York's right of privacy statute suggested that redress "for the
telecasting of [the plaintiff's] show" might be justified, although
certainly not under a privacy theory. 247 Even if these cases fail to
demonstrate implicit recognition of the right of publicity, as was
asserted in Stephano v. News Group Publications, Inc.248 and not
denied in Southeast Bank, N.A. v. Lawrence,249 a judge-made right
of publicity would merely supplement the existing body of judge-
made intellectual property law in the areas of unfair competition,
anti-dilution and common law copyright-which all seek to maintain
commercial morality and discourage unjust enrichment-rather than
establish an entirely new body of law requiring particularized know-
ledge .210
Moreover, as illustrated by the development of the right of publicity
in the federal courts, purportedly under New York law, 25' the right
of publicity lends itself to case-by-case evolution, 25 2 and thus invites
the development of common law.253 The New York courts, therefore,
need not hesitate to begin explicating the doctrine.
In determining when to revise a rule to serve contemporary society,
courts consider both the circumstances surrounding the rule's initial
appearance and developments affecting the relevant legal landscape.2 4
247. Id. at 361, 107 N.E.2d at 489 (Desmond, J., concurring).
248. 64 N.Y.2d 174, 183, 474 N.E.2d 580, 584, 485 N.Y.S.2d 220, 224 (1984);
see supra note 25 and accompanying text.
249. 66 N.Y.2d 910, 912, 489 N.E.2d 744, 745, 498 N.Y.S.2d 775, 776 (1985);
see supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
250. See supra notes 238-39 and accompanying text. See generally E. KINTNER
& J. LAHR, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW PRIMER 2-3 (2d ed. 1982).
251. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
252. See supra note 23.
253. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 325 (1981) (common law is
inappropriate when continuous attention, rather than "sporadic" or "ad hoc"
address, is required); id. at 352 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (common law useful
when case-by-case resolution necessary); CALABRESI, AGE OF STATUTES, supra note
205, at 163 (proper judicial lawmaking today "will also occur in areas in which,
despite the usual demands of modern society for quick and certain rules, a slow
judicial development of a new rule is still acceptable or even desirable").
254. See generally CALABRESI, AGE OF STATUTES, supra note 205, at 120-45.
Calabresi also mentions a third factor: the effect judicial action or inaction will
have on the legislature with respect to the rule. With regard to this factor, which
Calabresi calls "[alsymmetries in inertia," id. at 124, the courts should be most
inclined to revise a rule of dubious current value when the legislature is unlikely
to address the issue otherwise. See id. at 124-29; see also Breitel I, supra note
203, at 768 (courts will consider "the ease or difficulty with which . . . [a statute]
may be amended"). Under this view, by resisting much needed amendment to the
right of privacy statute twice in the last decade, see infra note 362, the legislature
is signaling the court that revision of the statute, whose entire current application
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When assessing the origin of a rule, courts first examine its age"'-
most agree that the older the rule, the more willing a court will be
to change it because it is more likely to be obsolete.256 New York's
right of privacy statute, passed in its essential form over seventy-five
years ago,2"7 is an old rule. Although rules obsolesce at different rates,
older rules are less likely to be responsive to current problems.258 While
the statute still achieves its purpose,2" it fails to address certain con-
temporary exploitations.26
Also, courts consider the circumstances of the rule's creation. 26'
If the legislature established the rule through deliberation and tem-
perance, the rule will receive far more deference than one created
through inadvertance or overreaction. 262 In passing the right of pri-
vacy statute, the New York Legislature quickly and decisively
responded263 to the outrageous invasion of Ms. Roberson's right to
be let alone26 by creating privacy rights vesting in the individual.2
61
Extensive public debate preceding enactment assured that the statute
properly remedied that situation. 266 The circumstances behind the
right of privacy statute indicate a willingness to protect individuals
from exploitation generally. The right of publicity is merely another
form of protection, albeit commercial. Thus, a court should not
hesitate to create a right of publicity.
is limited, requires judicial action. In essence, however, this argument restates the
legislative aquiescence doctrine discredited subsequently. See infra notes 307-12 and
accompanying text.
255. See CALABRESI, AGE OF STATUTES, supra note 205, at 131-34.
256. See Stone, The Common Law in the United States, in THE FUTURE OF THE
COMMON LAW 123-25 (1937) (endurance of old rule indicates its universality). But
see Traynor, supra note 218, at 414 (mere fact of rule's endurance discourages its
testing and consequent change to comport with new realities).
257. Compare 1903 N.Y. Laws ch. 132, §§ 1-2 with N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW
§§ 50, 51 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1987).
258. See CAIABREsI, AGE OF STATUTES, supra note 205, at 132-33 ("likelihood
that a new statute is based on distinctions that are not currently valid is much
less than if the statute were old").
259. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 145-96 and accompanying text.
261. See CALABRESI, AGE OF STATUTES, supra note 205, at 120-45.
262. See id. at 132 ("newborn statute may be the result of inadvertence, over-
reaction to a particular set of events, or a legislative response to temporary majority
at war with more persistent societal views"); Breitel I, supra note 203, at 768 (courts
will consider "the base of public support for the statute, the care and deliberateness
with which its purpose was made known and promoted, and the ease or difficulty
with which it was enacted").
263. See supra notes 83-87, 262 and accompanying text.
264. See supra note 75.
265. See 1903 N.Y. Laws ch. 132, §§ 1-2.
266. See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
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Furthermore, courts examine the policy behind the rule.267 Creation
of the right of privacy statute, first theorized thirteen years before
its enactment, 26s broadened protection of individuals to include their
right to be let alone. 269 A rule intended to expand rights, such as
New York's right of privacy statute, 270 is more properly expanded,
by the recognition of a common law right of publicity in this case,
than one that denied or restricted rights. 271
In addition, the courts examine how the legal landscape-i.e., the
legal rules and moral principles currently prevailing- 272 surrounding
the rule has changed since its creation. 273 In essence, courts using
this process seek to apply "some concept of what the law ought
to be, ' 274 and can base such a decision only on policy. 275 This
267. See Breitel I, supra note 203, at 768; see also Wellington, supra note 209,
at 233. Wellington distinguishes principle from policy-'"the latter is an instrumentaljustification for a rule, while the former is not." Id. at 223-24. According to him:
The breach of a strong duty (one created by a rule that is justified
primarily by a principle) empowers a court to pay less attention, in the
remedy it fashions, to the surprise of the defendant than does the breach
of a weak duty (one created by a rule primarily justified by a policy).
Id. at 233.
268. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 37, at 193.
269. See supra notes 73-99 and accompanying text.
270. See id. Amendments exempting certain practices of photographers and mer-
chants have subsequently narrowed the scope of protection provided by the statute.
See N.Y. Cirv. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (McKinney Supp. 1987).
271. See CALZaRESI, AGE OF STATUTES, supra note 205, at 139-40; cf. Textile
Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957), quoted in Illinois v. City
of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 103 n.5 (1972).
272. See Wellington, supra note 209, at 231.
273. See CALABRESi, AGE OF STATUTES, supra note 205, at 129-31.
274. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARv. L. REV.
593, 608 (1958) [hereinafter Hart], quoted in Friedmann, supra note 216, at 823.
As Friedmann elaborated:
[O]utside a "core of settled meaning," there is "a penumbra of debatable
cases in which words are neither obviously applicable nor obviously ruled
out .. " The application of the law to specific cases in the penumbra
area is admitted not to be a matter of logical deduction and reasoning.
"[T]he criterion which makes a decision sound in such cases is some
concept of what the law ought to be."
Friedmann, supra note 216, at 823 (quoting Hart, supra, at 607-608).
275. See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 349 (1981) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) ("[w]hen choosing the precise legal principles to apply, common law
courts draw upon relevant standards of conduct available in their communities").
In an earlier case, Judge Learned Hand stated:
Of course it is true that the words used, even in their literal sense, are
the primary, and ordinarily the most reliable, source of interpreting the
meaning of any writing: be it a statute, a contract, or anything else.
But it is one of the surest indexes of a mature and developed jurisprudence
not to make a fortress out of the dictionary; but to remember that
statutes always have some purpose or object to accomplish, whose sym-
[Vol. XV
1987] RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
analysis includes an examination of the common law around the
rule,276 related statutes, 277 constitutional law278 and scholarly discussion
of the issue. 279
Applying such an analysis to the right of publicity question, a
court would find that although the age of regional telegraphic com-
munications has given way to the modern era of media ubiquity,
New York's right of privacy statute retains its turn of the century
form.2 0 The persona, however, has assumed a public value entirely
distinct from its traditional meaning.281 Judges and legislators in
other states have ascertained and adjusted to this development through
common law and statutory lawmaking. 2 2 Scholars, too, support the
concept of a right of publicity with virtual unanimity. 23 It is both
timely and fitting that courts extend New York's right of privacy,
an expansionist rule in the first place, 284 to provide plaintiffs with
full protection of their personas. 215
pathetic and imaginative discovery is the surest guide to their meaning.
Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1945), quoted in Friedmann, supra
note 216, at 831; id. at 826 (policy element in judicial decision making may be
refined, "[b]ut there must always remain a point at which a choice has to be
made").
276. See CALABREsI, AGE OF STATUTES, supra note 205, at 129; Friedmann, supra
note 216, at 838 (appropriate to fashion common law when rule occupies position
in broad common law field); Wellington, supra note 209, at 236.
277. See CALABRESI, AGE OF STATUTES, supra note 205, at 129-30; Friedmann,
supra note 216, at 837 (recent debate of pertinent legislation should discourage
courts from making law); Wellington, supra note 209, at 236.
278. See CALABREsI, AGE OF STATUTES, supra note 205, at 130; Wellington, "supra
note 209, at 236.
279. See CALABRlsI, AGE OF STATUTES, supra note 205, at 131; Wellington, supra
note 209, at 237 (political platforms, speeches and campaign promises; public opinion
polls; and professional articles).
280. Compare N.Y. Crv. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50, 51 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1987)
with 1903 N.Y. Laws ch. 132, §§ 1-2.
281. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 575-76 (1977);
Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953); Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876, 880
(S.D.N.Y. 1973).
282. See Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 824, 603 P.2d 425, 431,
160 Cal. Rptr. 323, 329 (1979) (en banc) (recognizing non-descendible right of publi-
city); Martin Luther King, Jr., Center For Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage
Prods., Inc., 250 Ga. 135, 145, 296 S.E.2d 697, 705 (1982) (recognizing descendible
right of publicity); Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 90 Wis. 2d 379, 403, 280
N.W.2d 129, 140 (1979) (extending right of publicity's scope to nicknames). See supra
note 11 for statutes establishing, to a greater or lesser degree, a right of publicity
under state law.
283. See supra note 12.
284. See supra notes 269-71 and accompanying text.
285. See supra note 271 and accompanying text (expansionist rule allows greater
common law development); supra notes 73-99 and accompanying text (demonstrating
that right of privacy statute expanded protectable rights of New York plaintiffs).
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C. Rationales for Judge-Made Law
Presuming the desirability of the right of publicity, some authority
maintains that only legislatures should create the right because courts
are not empowered to make such law. 286 New York's Legislature,
however, has failed to augment the statute's protection of individuals
in any manner, 27 least of all to extend protection to voice, style
and personal attributes, to non-commercial appropriations and to
heirs and legatees. 28 Given the New York Legislature's inertia toward
creation of a right of publicity and the right's amenability to judicial
acknowledgement in the state, this Section considers the lack of
power argument in the context of various arguments proffered by
supporters of judge-made law to counter it.
Supporters of judicial lawmaking give several justifications for
their position. 29 First, under what is known as the implicit delegation
doctrine, they assert that by failure to act, elective bodies have
286. See infra notes 294-306 and accompanying text.
287. In both 1976 and 1977, the New York State Law Revision Commission
proposed amendments to New York's right of privacy statute so that the law might
include Prosser's intrusion branch of the privacy tort. Memorandum of the Law
Revision Commission Relating to Expansion of the Civil Right of Privacy, [1977]
N.Y. LAw REV. COMM'N REP., reprinted in [1977] N.Y. Laws 2231 (McKinney);
Memorandum of the Law Revision Commission Relating to Expansion of the Civil
Right of Privacy, [19761 N.Y.-LAw REV. CoMM'N REP., reprinted in [1976] 2 N.Y.
Laws 2234 (McKinney). The bills, which would have added language protecting an
individual from "an unreasonable invasion of privacy that would be highly offensive
to a reasonable person," N.Y.S. 3304, N.Y.A. 6771, 200th Sess. (1977); N.Y.S.
7693, N.Y.A. 10351, 199th Sess. (1976), languished in committee without ever
reaching the full house for a vote. Legislative History of the Law Revision Com-
mission's Recommendation Submitted in 1977 Relating to Expansion of the Civil
Right of Privacy, [1978] N.Y. LAw REV. Comm'N REP., reprinted in [1978] N.Y.
Laws 1603 (McKinney); Legislative History of the Law Revision Commission's
Recommendation Submitted in 1976 Relating to Expansion of the Civil Right of
Privacy, [1977] N.Y. LAw REV. COMM'N REP., reprinted in [1977] 2 N.Y. Laws
2189 (McKinney).
288. Legislators have not proposed any right of publicity amendments, although
commentators have suggested it. See, e.g., Sims, supra note 12, at 498.
289. See generally CALABRsI, AGE OF STATUTES, supra note 205, at 92-96. This
Note does not consider judicial lawmaking necessitated by the passage of statutes
with terms so broad in meaning that construction inevitably gives way to creation.
The author believes such judicial activity more closely resembles statutory con-
struction than common law creation. See Traynor, supra note 218, at 419-20.
Nonetheless, the purposeful enactment of broad statutes is a compelling justification
for judicial lawmaking in the statutory era. See Breitel I, supra note 203, at 761.
Chief Judge Breitel has stated the argument this way:
The legislature often legislates in broad stark terms with the intention
of passing deliberately to the courts the burden of further elaboration
in lawmaking upon the skeletal statutory schemes enacted. ... Statutes
using standards of reason, standards of discretion, or other terms of
broad definition are designed to leave the balance of the lawmaking
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implicitly delegated this power to the courts. 290 Although the leg-
islature's failure to act may imply authorization of judges to make
law, other explanations often exist. Legislative inaction may indicate
distraction, time insufficiency or evasion of politically sensitive is-
sues. 291 Cognizant of these other explanations, 292 supporters of the
implicit delegation doctrine reason, in essence, that necessity justifies
recognition of a rule. 293
Such reasoning, however, encourages the courts to take an ag-
gressive antimajoritarian approach to non-constitutional matters, 294
thus undermining the separation of powers principle. 295 Not only
does an "end-justifies-the-means" attitude concerning judicial law-
making disregard this country's embrace of a tripartite government
empowering the legislature with primary responsibility for lawmaking
but it also obscures the policies supporting that choice. On the one hand,
through bicameralism, 296 opposing lobbies, 297 rules for deliberation 298
process to the courts, and sometimes to the executive.
Id.; cf. Friedmann, supra note 216, at 829 (legislator can "transfer a certain legal
branch to regulation by judicial fiat ... when he ... establishes a dominant
directive and enforceable general legal principles controlling this field, a principle
that the judge has to develop only to find (not make) the law in the individual
case").
290. CALABREsI, AGE OF STATUTES, supra note 205, at 92. "[T]he legislative
determination to leave certain matters to the courts is often consciously made by
the negative device of sheer inaction." Breitel I, supra note 203, at 762. Contra
City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 332 n.24 (1981) (failure to enact a
statute is "not the best of guides to legislative intent") (citation omitted).
291. See Breitel I, supra note 203, at 762 ("it is not always possible to distinguish
deliberate deferment in the legislative process from inaction resulting from deadlock
or the evasion of responsibilities because of fear of political consequences"); Hart,
Comment, supra note 203, at 47 ("possible reasons for the legislature's failure to
act, and hence the possible interpretations of the silence, are always numerous and
sometimes innumerable").
292. See Breitel I, supra note 203, at 762.
293. See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 325 (1981) ("one of the
major concerns underlying the recognition of federal common law in Illinois v.
Milwaukee" was "that Illinois did not have any forum in which to protect its in-
terests unless federal common law were created"); see also Breitel I, supra note 203,
at 762 (implicitly).
294. See CALABREsx, AGE OF STATUTES, supra note 205, at 163-64.
295. Id. at 164; Friedmann, supra note 216, at 822.
296. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, art. II, art. III; N.Y. CONST. art. I, art. II,
art. III.
297. See HART & SACKS, LEGAL PROCESS, supra note 209, at 740, 829-34 (citations
omitted); Breitel I, supra note 203, at 762; Wellington, supra note 209, at 238,
240-41.
298. In New York, for example, neither house may pass a bill "unless it shall
have been printed and upon the desks of the members, in its final form, at least
three calendar legislative days prior to its final passage." N.Y. CONST. art. III,
§ 14. The requirement may only be circumvented by the Governor, but only upon
19871
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and the sheer size of our legislatures,299 our system of lawmaking engenders
inertia. In turn, this legislative inertia creates a presumption of the
status quo and hinders the progress of worthy causes.30 On the other
hand, deliberation by a large representative body also protects the
public from the excesses of special interests" ' and the dangers of short-
sighted statutes.30 2 Therefore, the mere need of a right of publicity
in New York30 3 is not sufficient justification for its recognition by
the state's courts.
In addition, legislative inaction sometimes reflects the will of the
public to maintain the status quo.3°4 In effect, judicial lawmaking
under these circumstances overrules the legislature.3 5 This situation,
too, .violates separation of powers and the policies behind it.306
The legislative acquiescence doctrine, a corollary of the implicit
delegation doctrine, maintains that legislative inaction in the second
instance, i.e., after the court has made law, ratifies the common
presentation of a message of necessity outlining facts warranting an immediate
vote. Id. Nonetheless, the legislators must still have the bill on their desks in final
form before passage. Id. In addition, no bill shall "be passed or become a law,
except by the assent of a majority of the members elected to each branch of the
legislature." Id. Bills "appropriating the public moneys or property for local or
private purposes" require the assent of two-thirds of both houses for passage. Id.
§ 20. Finally, three-fifths of the members of either house is necessary to constitute
a quorum for final passage of any tax or appropriations bill. Id. § 23. See generally
HART & SACKS, LEGAL PROCESS, supra note 209, at 745-47.
299. The United States Congress has 535 members. See CONGRESSIONAL DIREC-
TORY, supra note 213, at 263 (Senate), 308 (House); 1986-87: THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT MANUAL, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL REGISTER 23-24 (1986). The New
York State Legislature contains 211 people. See THE RED BOOK, supra note 214,
.at 31. Forty-one other states have legislatures of 100 or more persons. See STATE
ELECTIVE OFFICIALS & THE LEGISLATURES 1987-88, THE COUNCIL OF STATE Gov-
ERNMENTS Vi (1987) (table presenting number of legislators in each state); see also
BOOK OF STATES, supra note 213, at 87 (same).
300. See Traynor, supra note 218, at 414.
301. See, e.g., HART & SACKS, LEGAL PROCESS, supra note 209, at 895-902
(quoting Regier, The Struggle for Federal Food and Drug Legislation, 1 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 3-12 (1933)) (describing slow but eventually successful passage
of Food and Drug Act despite minority opposition of powerful business interests).
302. Some authorities maintain that not even the deliberation of large legislatures
is sufficient to catch all faulty statutes. See Traynor, supra note 218, at 426-27
(no quality control on statutes); Breitel, The Courts and Lawmaking, in LEGAL
INSTITUTIONS TODAY AND TOMORROW 20-21 (Paulsen ed. 1959) [hereinafter Breitel
Ill.
303. See supra notes 136-96 and accompanying text.
304. See Breitel II, supra note 302, at 12.
305. See, e.g., Southern Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of Mount
Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 423 U.S.
808 (1975) (requiring municipalities to provide realistic opportunity for low and
moderate income housing in their land use regulations).
306. See supra notes 294-302 and accompanying text.
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law just made.30 7 This view assumes that law is ubiquitous, that
there is no non-law.3 0 8 Accordingly, when the legislature omits to
proscribe an act, such as exploitation of another's right of publicity,
it effectively approves the act. 3°9 Under this view, the legislature is
an instrument chartered to do nothing in order that something may
be done, i.e., that the status quo, with its newly created common
law, may be maintained. The legislature, however, is not an insti-
tution for the perfunctory recordation of previously determined in-
itiatives, but rather, a deliberative body.310 Legislative inaction reflects
an absence of agreement rather than a ratification; it is not an
enactment of the status quo that would render law, which had
originally been beyond the scope of judicial lawmaking, interstitial3 '
and thus capable of common lawmaking. In other words, the New
York Legislature's failure to invalidate a plaintiff's recovery on what
were apparently right of publicity grounds does not ratify the com-
mon law made in that case.31 2
A third argument justifies judicial power to make law on the
ground that such judge-made rules are subject to legislative or popular
revision, and hence are acceptable in a democracy.3"' This view,
307. See supra note 290.
308. See Breitel I, supra note 203, at 749.
309. See id.
310. In the words of H.L.A. Hart:
A legislature is a deliberative body. It is an instrument for arriving at
a consensus, not an instrument for recording a consensus previously
arrived at, as if by some mysterious emanation from the electorate. To
arrive at a consensus, the legislature follows an elaborate procedure of
investigation and consideration eventuating in approval of particular form
of words as law. For the courts to treat the legislature as making law
by any other means is to treat this procedure and this agreement upon
a particular form of words as mere froufrou-without any real function.
But it is not froufrou.
Hart, Comment, supra note 203, at 46-47.
311. The term "interstitial law," as used in this Note, connotes unwritten law
that comports with previously articulated rules, but which may only be arrived at
by substantial construction and specific application. While courts sometimes venture
beyond the interstitial when making law, see supra note 305, and some commentators
support such activity, see, e.g., Breitel I, supra note 203, at 754-55; Traynor, supra
note 218, at 420, the strong policies underlying this country's separation of powers
principle militate against approval of such judicial lawmaking. See supra notes 289-
302 and accompanying text.
312. See supra notes 241-47 and accompanying text.
313. See CALABREsI, AGE OF STATUTES, supra note 205, at 92-93; see also Fried-
mann, supra note 216, at 838 ("the propriety of such judicial initiative is not
diminished by the fact that the legislature may proceed to renounce judicial in-
novation"); Hart, Comment, supra note 203, at 44 (legislature performs function
of review and correction of "grounds of decision developed by the courts"). Compare
19871
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advocated by those who feel judges should not abdicate their law-
making function in the name of judicial restraint,3 14 also emphasizes
the inertia of the legislature and the public.315 Furthermore, it implies
that judge-made law, as much as legislation generally, reflects the
will of the people. Actually, this view suggests that the law does
not reflect the beliefs of the majority at all but those of an organized
minority with the initiative to seek legal change in the courts and
the legislatures. In other words, the interested, who regularly vote,
also sue, and the apathetic, who usually do not vote, also do not
sue. Therefore, the interested instigate both statutes and decisions
and the apathetic are represented only by the foresight of the official
lawmakers. Perhaps true, this practical analysis nevertheless conflicts
with the theoretical division of powers discussed above.31 6
When analyzed closely, moreover, the inherent limitation argument
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972) (recognizing action for nuisance
under federal common law when Congress had not acted on interstate pollution)
with City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981) (refusing to uphold action
for nuisance under federal common law after Congress passed statute addressing
the problem).
314. See Traynor, supra note 218, at 427 (implicitly).
315. See Breitel I, supra note 203, at 769.
Popular lawmaking can occur in two ways: referendum or initiative. Referendum
is "[tihe process of referring to the electorate for approval a proposed new State
constitution or amendment (constitutional referendum) or of a law passed by the
legislature (statutory referendum)." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1152 (5th ed. 1979).
Initiative, on the other hand, is "[an electoral process whereby designated per-
centages of the electorate may initiate legislative or constitutional changes through
the filing of formal petitions to be acted on by the legislature or the total electorate."
Id. at 705. In other words, "the referendum enables the voters to accept or reject
the legislature's proposals, while the initiative allows the voters both to make their
own proposals and to pass upon the proposals of other voters." Ranney, The
United States of America, in REFERENDUMS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF PRACTICE
AND THEORY 67 (D. Butler ed. 1978).
Every state except Delaware permits constitutional referendums. See BooK OF
STATES, supra note 213, at 69. Fewer states, however, allow direct statutory law-
making. As of 1986, 37 states and the District of Columbia permitted statutory
referendums, see id. at 215-16 (table), while only 21 states and the District of
Columbia allowed statutory initiatives. See id. at 214 (table). California "stands
alone among the large urban industrial states ... in employing both the consti-
tutional amendment initiative and direct statutory initiative." Lee, California, in
REFERENDUMS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF PRACTICE AND THEORY 88 (D. Butler ed.
1978). New York, in contrast, does not even permit initiative. See BooK OF STATES,
supra note 213, at 214 (table). See generally THE POPULAR INTEREST VERSUS THE
PUBLIC INTEREST . . . A REPORT ON THE POPULAR INITIATIVE, NEW YORK SENATE
RESEARCH SERVICE, TASK FORCE ON CRITICAL PROBLEMS (1979). In addition, use
of referendums is limited in New York. The constitution only permits referendums
on matters affecting the state's debt, see N.Y. CONST. art. VII, §§ 11, 14, art.
XVIII, § 3, and limited situations effecting local governments. See id. art. IX,
§ 1(d), (h). Popular lawmaking has not significantly effected New York.
316. See supra notes 294-302 and accompanying text.
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proves circular. Limitation, in this case by legislative veto or popular
initiative, does not justify a rule, here the propriety of judicial
lawmaking. The ability to override judicial determinations does not
justify them in the first place. It merely reins in the judiciary once
it has improperly acted.
The fourth justification for judicial lawmaking emphasizes the
notion that courts do look at election returns, because of the nature
of judicial selection," 7 to ascertain the legal landscape."a8 While judges
are capable of reading the public will, they do so through institutional
blinders. 1 9 This myopia results from several factors. First, judges
can decide cases only on the facts presented,3 20 and, generally speak-
ing, those decisions can address only those issues raised by counsel. 21
While the analyses of judges often exceed the issues at hand, the
rule of dictum 22 specifically limits the persuasiveness of such as-
sertions.3 23 Second, the legislature's apparatus for ascertaining social
conditions surpasses that of the court in the resolution of conflicts.3 24
Legislatures, unlike the courts, provide greater access to all indi-
viduals,3 25 the opportunity for more thorough investigation, 26 and
317. See generally Note, Insulating Incumbent Judges From the Vicissitudes of
the Political Arena: Retention Elections As a Viable Alternative, 15 FoRDHAM URS.
L.J. 743 (1987).
318. See CALABREsI, AGE OF STATUTES, supra note 205, at 93-94; Wellington,
supra note 209, at 240 ("no better process available for selecting a socially desirable
policy" than judicial process).
319. Although certain judges have tremendous vision, as an institutional matter,
judicial procedure, political dependence and systematic isolation narrow the scope
of judicial opinions. See Breitel I, supra note 203, at 769.
320. See id. at 749 ("law is made only at the instigation of those interested").
321. Id. at 770 ("courts are limited to viewing the problem as presented in a
litigated case within the four corners of its record"); Friedmann, supra note 216,
at 839 (because courts "develop the law on a case-by-case basis they can not as
can the legislature, undertake the establishment of a new legal institution, 'an
elaborate procedure of investigation and consideration eventuating in the approval
of a particular form of words as law' ") (citations omitted).
322. See JONEs, LEGAL METHOD, supra note 204, at 113-14. "Dicta are pro-
nouncements on points which need not be considered in order to reach a decision
and are, therefore, in most cases, pronouncements on points on which the court
has not had the benefit of argument." Id. at 114. As a result, such pronouncements
"may be persuasive, but are not binding." Id. at 113.
323. Id.
324. See Breitel I, supra note 203, at 762; Hart, Comment, supra note 203, at
45.
325. See Breitel I, supra note 203, at 762; Wellington, supra note 209, at 238.
Litigation is too expensive for many people to test issues affecting them, and even
if they have the money, the doctrines of justiciability may preclude a judicial
determination on the merits of their issue.
326. See Breitel I, supra note 203, at 762. But see Wellington, supra note 209,
at 240-41. In the courts, on the other hand, the rules of evidence constrain
investigation. See, e.g., FED. R. Evm. 401-402 (permitting admission of narrowly
1987]
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public debate of countervailing factors.3 27 Courts can neither scan
the law's foreground nor probe its horizon. Thus, even if New York
voters registered overwhelming support for acknowledgment of a right
of publicity, judges would not be justified in recognizing the right
at common law.
Under a fifth theory, judges should follow their own values in
developing common law since it is their educated and disinterested
sense of the community interest that is sought.3 2s The founding
fathers, aware that fair adjudication requires independence of judges,
largely insulated the judiciary from outside criticism.3 29 Although
such seclusion secures for the judiciary an independence that is both
necessary for unbiased dispute resolution and foreign to the legis-
lature,330 removal from a position of political accountability also
renders judges less responsive to the needs of the community. 3
Furthermore, this paternalistic view does not comport with respect
for our basic majoritarian institutions.332
The best and classic justification for judicial lawmaking power,
however, emphasizes "the subservience of courts to principles, to
rational decisionmaking, and to the whole fabric of the law." '333 The
defined "relevant evidence"); id. 611(c) (proscribing use of leading questions on
direct examination in most circumstances); id. 802 (prohibiting admission of hearsay
evidence in general).
327. See Breitel I, supra note 203, at 762; see also HART & SACKS, LEGAL
PROCESS, supra note 209, at 746-47 (Senate filibuster). But see id. at 746 (discussing
time limitations on floor debate in Senate and House, and ability of Rules Committee
to control debate in latter).
328. See CALABREsI, AGE OF STATUTES, supra note 205, at 94-96; Breitel I, supra
note 203, at 766 (scholars "believe the judicial process, as compared with the
political legislative process, is a mine of stimulating opportunities to discuss, develop
and rationalize the law. After all, more judges than legislators read the law reviews
and treatises") (emphasis added); Friedmann, supra note 216, at 836 ("the im-
portation of personal ideology or prejudice into a judicial interpretation, in the
face of accepted principles of statutory or common law interpretation ... is ex-
tremely rare"); Hart, Comment, supra note 203, at 42 ("courts are the only
institution which is manned by personnel with the training that is requisite ...
for the authoritative exposition of principle").
329. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (particularly lifetime tenure and irreducable
salary clauses).
330. See Breitel I, supra note 203, at 761.
331. See id. at 770.
332. See supra notes 294-302 and accompanying text.
333. CALABREsI, AGE OF STATUTES, supra note 205, at 96. Another commentator
states:
The judicial process is based on reasoning and presupposes . . . that its
determinations are justified only when explained or explainable in reason.
No poll, no majority vote of the affected, no rule of expediency, and
certainly no confessedly subjective or idiosyncratic view justifies a judicial
determination. Emphatically, no claim of might, physical or political,
justifies a judicial determination.
Breitel I, supra note 203, at 772.
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judicial process, properly administered, can develop law only incre-
mentally.334 When courts express this power cautiously, they can
advance society. 3 5 Indeed, one scholar has stated that the strength
of the common law derives "from the manner in which it has been
forged from actual experience by the hammer and anvil of litiga-
tion." '336 While judicial lawmaking raises theoretical problems re-
garding the separation of powers,337 as a pragmatic matter, the slow
development of common law has benefited society338 and no leg-
islature has banned common law in its state.339 Practically, the slow
development of common law provides legislatures with the oppor-
tunity to observe new approaches without taking responsibility for
them. If it disagrees with the approach, the legislature can overrule
the decision.34° In conclusion, the slow development of common law
consistent with existing rules constitutes proper judicial action.
In sum, courts have historically adjudicated disputes by two means:
interpreting statutes and making common law.141 While today's active
legislatures address a much broader spectrum of legal issues than
334. See CALABREsi, AGE OF STATUTES, supra note 205, at 4.
335. See Wellington, supra note 209, at 236; cf. Breitel I, supra note 203, at
770-71 (antimajoritarian judiciary "is not the proper organ for lawmaking on the
molar scale in a democratically organized society").
336. Stone, The Common Law in the United States, in THE FUTURE OF THE
COMMON LAW 124 (1937).
337. See supra notes 294-302 and accompanying text.
338. The development of products liability law in New York powerfully illustrates
legal advancement affected by judicial lawmaking. See, e.g., Micallef v. Miehle
Co., 39 N.Y. 376, 385-86, 348 N.E.2d 571, 577-78, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115, 121-22 (1976)
(holding that manufacturer cannot avoid liability for failure to install safety device
merely because danger was obvious); Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 335, 298
N.E.2d 622, 624, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461, 463 (1973) (extending liability of manufacturer
of defective product to bystander); Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument, 12 N.Y.2d
432, 437, 191 N.E.2d 81, 83, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592, 595 (1963) (indicating that manufac-
turer of defective component part might be liable under warranty in appropriate case);
MacPherson v. Buick Motor, Inc., 217 N.Y. 382, 389, 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (1916)
(holding that manufacturer may be liable in negligence for injuries resulting from
* product that is unreasonably dangerous when manufactured defectively despite lack
of privity with plaintiff).
339. Cf. U.C.C. § 1-103 (1978) (adopting common law when code does not
speak to issue).
340. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 990 (West Supp. 1987) (superseding Lugosi v.
Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979)
(en banc), by permitting descendibility of decedent's right of publicity regardless
of its exploitation by decedent); 1903 N.Y. Laws ch. 132, §§ 1-2 (current amended
version at N.Y. Cirv. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50, 51 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1987))
(superseding Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442
(1902), by creating right of privacy).
341. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
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those of a century ago,342 room still exists for judicial lawmaking.143
The limited protection which New York's right of privacy statute
gives to individuals with marketable personas, and especially the
preclusion of assignment and descent of rights in one's name or
likeness,344 render acknowledgement of the right of publicity by New
York courts appropriate. Because explication of the right of publicity
requires little technical expertise3 45 and may be done on a case-by-
case basis,3 46 the right is particularly amenable to judicial recognition.
Technically, such judicial action would violate the separation of
powers doctrine.3 47 As a practical matter, however, the practice should
be promoted because it provides the legislature with alternatives for
which it need not take responsibility and which it may overrule if
necessary.3 48
IV. Conclusion
New York courts have ample justification for allocating to the
legislature the burden of inertia surrounding recognition of the right
of publicity.3 49 Although the state's right of privacy statute was
designed to redress emotional discomfort,350 today's plaintiffs often
use it to compensate for pecuniary harm.35" ' The right of publicity,
on the other hand, specifically addresses commercial harm.352 Logic
dictates that the courts should apply the doctrine implicated rather
than stretch an ill-fitting doctrine to remedy this situation. In ad-
dition, the statute's scope, limited to the unauthorized publication
of a plaintiff's photograph for advertising purposes situation"3 pre-
342. See supra notes 213-15 and accompanying text.
343. See supra notes 144-96 and accompanying text.
344. See id.
345. See supra notes 239-50 and accompanying text.
346. See supra notes 251-53 and accompanying text.
347. See supra notes 294-302 and accompanying text.
348. See supra notes 333-40 and accompanying text.
349. According to one scholar:
It is the judgmental function . .. of deciding when a rule has come to
be sufficiently out of phase with the whole legal framework so that,
whatever its age, it can only stand if a current majoritarian or repre-
sentative body reaffirms it. It is to be the allocator of that burden of
inertia which our system of separation of powers and checks and balances
mandates.
CALAaREsi, AGE OF STATUTES, supra note 205, at 164.
350. See supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
351. See supra notes 137-43 and accompanying text.
352. See supra notes 114-19 and accompanying text.
353. N.Y. Crv. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50, 51 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1987).
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sented in Roberson ,3 4 fails to reach abuses of which plaintiffs now
complain. These abuses, which include exploitation of an individual's
sound"5 or style356 and even appropriation of a decedent's name or
likeness,35 7 fall under the aegis of the right of publicity. 58 Finally,
strict construction of the statute"19 further constrains its application.316
On the one hand, the courts may spur reform "by deliberately
stressing an antiquated principle, in the expectation that the legislature
will take remedial action. "361 Legislative inaction regarding the right
of publicity,3 62 however, indicates that recognition of the law requires
judicial action.3 63 Therefore, by judging the right of privacy rule
too limited and developing right of publicity principles to supplement
the statute, the courts may ameliorate the situation, prompt statutory
reform 64 or even spur majoritarian reaffirmation of the old rule.3 65
Although the state's courts must justify any right of publicity rule
they develop and keep it current, 6 6 they need not "promulgate the
new ... to find that the old fails. ' 36 7 In other words, New York
courts may recognize a common law right of publicity, overruling
its traditional prohibition, without determining the parameters of
the right except as regards the plaintiff. In addition, the courts need
not obtain majority support for the new common law rule.3 6 The
354. 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902).
355. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
356. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
357. See supra notes 100-105 and accompanying text.
358. See. generally supra notes 100-33 and accompanying text.
359. See supra note 190.
360. See supra note 191.
361. Friedmann, supra note 216, at 838; see CALABREsI, AGE OF STATUTES, supra
note 205, at 156. Another commentator has stated: "The organ for applying law,
in this case a court, has no choice whether to decide or not; it cannot avoid
decision, whatever one may think; it must decide for one side or another. It does."
Breitel I, supra note 203, at 749.
362. See supra note 287.
363. Cf. supra notes 144-96 and accompanying text (presenting other limitations
of the statute); see also supra note 254 (discussing whether courts should consider
asymmetries in inertia before making law).
364. See Friedmann, supra note 216, at 842 ("an important aspect of judicial
creativeness . . . [is] the development of new principles, not in substitution but in
preparation for statutory reform").
365. See CALABREsi, AGE OF STATUTES, supra note 205, at 165.
366. See Wellington, supra note 209, at 225.
367. See CALAmBRsI, AGE OF STATUTES, supra note 205, at 165.
368. See Wellington, supra note 209, at 238 (majority support for judicially
created policies is not necessary for we "know enough about interest group politics
and public apathy to be confident that many legislative and executive policies would
not be endorsed by a popular majority").
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examples of federal courts, 69 and state courts3 70 and legislatures,3 7'
however, provide strong support for recognition of a common law
right of publicity in New York. The approach of California, whose
courts recognized a right of publicity3 72 and whose legislature sub-
sequently superseded that common law right by creating a statutory
descendible right of publicity, 373 is especially significant because its
media industry rivals that of New York.3 4 Finally, the common law
may attach to outmoded statutes as much as to decisional law. 375
In this way, the New York courts may complement the legislature's
action by fulfilling its policy of protecting an individual's persona
from commercial exploitation .376
369. See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977);
Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 953 (1980); Frank Lloyd Wright Found. v. Heinz, 229 U.S.P.Q. 201 (W.D.
Wis. 1986); Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277 (D. Minn. 1970); see also
supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
370. See, e.g., Martin Luther King, Jr., Center for Social Change, Inc. v.
American Heritage Prods., Inc., 250 Ga. 135, 296 S.E.2d 697 (1982) (Supreme
Court of Georgia decided, on certified questions, that common law of the State
contained a right of publicity which could descend without lifetime exploitation.
This case is particularly noteworthy because Georgia also has a right of privacy,
recognized at common law in Pavesich, see supra notes 47-49 and accompanying
text, which closely resembles that in New York); see also Lugosi v. Universal Pictures,
25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979) (superseded by statute creating
descendible right); Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 90 Wis. 2d 379, 280
N.W.2d 129 (1979).
371. See supra note 11.
372. See Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal.
Rptr. 323 (1979); Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 25 Cal. 3d 860, 603 P.2d
454, 160 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1979).
373. See CAL. Crv. CODE §§ 990, 3344 (West Supp. 1987).
374. See generally 100 Largest Media Companies, Advertising Age, June 27,
1985, passim.
375. In other words, just as a common law right of publicity may fill interstices
in the common law, it may also extend the right of privacy statute to address
commercial aspects within right of publicity doctrine. See CALABRESI, AGE OF
STATUTES, supra note 205, at 166; Breitel II, supra note 302, at 21-22 ("lawmaking
role of the courts is not determined primarily by whether stated principles or rules
of law are statutory or decisional in origin"), quoted with approval in Friedmann,
supra note 216, at 833.
376. See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 334 (1981) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). One scholar has expounded on the relationship:
Effective collaboration between legislatures and courts requires, on the
one hand, that legislatures leave room in their enactments for the exercise
by the courts of their distinctive function of reasoned elaboration of
the law. It requires, on the other hand, that courts have a conception of
their function which is adequate to enable them to make good use of
the room which the legislatures leave[] them.
Hart, Comment, supra note 203, at 43.
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In conclusion, while recognition of the right of publicity presents
theoretical problems, 377 in practice such judicial action would cause
little harm. Today's right of publicity, a creature of yesterday's
courts,378 has benefited society. Indeed, no legislature has rejected
a court-made rule recognizing the right of publicity. 79 New York
judges should no longer hesitate to follow the lead of their brethren
throughout the country.
Frederick R. Kessler
377. See supra notes 286-348 and accompanying text.
378. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
379. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 990 (West Supp. 1987) (superseding Lugosi v. Universal
Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425,. 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979), by permitting
descendibility of right of publicity with exploitation by decedent); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 47-25-1103 (1984) (superseding Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc.,
616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir. 1980), by permitting descendibility of right of publicity).
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